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ABSTRACT 
Special operations forces (SOF) have not stepped off the battlefield in 
twenty years, and the strains of war are beginning to show. This thesis analyzes the 
culture and ethical foundation of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) by 
examining the internal and external factors influencing the force. A once prestigious 
reputation has been marred with accounts of ethical misconduct and war crimes. In 
response, SOCOM conducted a force-wide comprehensive ethics review in 2019. 
While SOCOM’s own report admitted that problems within the organization exist, it did 
not identify the causal factors involved let alone offer a remedy to address them. 
Drawing on theories from the fields of social psychology, anthropology, moral 
philosophy, and organizational management reveals the impact of internal and external 
influences on human behavior. Analysis of these factors suggests that SOCOM does 
have an ethics problem and that the problem is intrinsically linked to the misaligned 
culture. A culture shaped by combat. Overdemand and overreliance on SOF has 
resulted in unsustainable growth, a mismanaged force, and identity issues within 
SOCOM. The organizational issues are further influenced by the ideals of 
American exceptionalism and complicated by changing social values and norms. 
SOCOM is a complex organization. Understanding the influences that contribute 
to unethical behavior is critical for SOCOM to regain the trust of the American public 
and refocus the force. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE IMPACT OF INFLUENCE ON
AMERICA’S ELITE WARRIORS 
A. SOCOM COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW
Nearly two decades of war have proven costly for America’s elite fighting force,
the United States Special Operation Command (USSOCOM). A prestigious organization 
once thought to be “frayed at the seams” now seems to be unravelling.1 Multiple 
allegations of ethical misconduct and war crimes have overshadowed the professional 
dedication of the special operations community, threatening the trust of the very people 
they swore to protect. The missteps have caused civilian leaders to question their faith in 
special operations forces (SOF) moral fabric and ethical culture. In response, a 2017 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2018 called on SOCOM leadership to 
conduct a thorough assessment of the SOF culture, prompting the USSOCOM directed 
“Comprehensive Review (CR) of professionalism and ethics programs for special 
operations forces” completed in 2019.2 This was not the first assessment of this kind 
ordered by congressional leaders in response to ethical violations. A similar 2011 review 
of SOF titled Pressure on the Forces and Family (POTFF) was conducted amidst 
allegations of misconduct and misuse of SOF troops finding multiple factors, such as 
continuous deployments, compressed training cycles, and force management were 
negatively affecting the force and their families.3  
It would appear as though the 2011 POTFF report would have little effect in 
changing future behavior. Many of the findings from the 2011 report were repeated in the 
2019 CR; both reports indicate a culture that revolved around mission accomplishment to 
the detriment of developing SOF leaders, and an over extended force struggling to balance 
the needs of the mission with the needs of their families. These findings should come as no 
1 William McRaven, Pressure on the Force and Families (POTFF) Review (Tampa Bay, FL: 
USSOCOM, 2012). 1. 
2 USSOCOM, United States Special Operation Command Comprehensive Review (Tampa Bay, FL: 
USSOCOM, 2019). 
3 McRaven, Pressure on the Force and Families (POTFF) Review. 
2 
surprise as special operators have borne much of the burden of the global war on terror 
(GWOT). Remaining on the battlefield for twenty years has exhausted the force and been 
a contributor to the erosion of moral and ethical decision- making. The 2019 CR asserted 
that SOCOM did not have a systemic ethics problem, but that cracks in the cultural 
foundation existed.4  
To better understand how the CR panel came to this assessment, thorough analysis 
of the current SOCOM climate and culture is needed. Examining SOCOM through the lens 
of moral philosophy, social psychology, and organizational culture may provide a useful 
analytical framework necessary to better understand the complex issues within the SOF 
community. The CR found multiple factors that affect the force and provided ample actions 
items for SOCOM leadership. Certain recommendations were clear, such as “conduct an 
internal audit of currently deployed SOF against current valid requirements” and “recoup 
SOF forward deployed not under a valid requirement or part of a validated contingency 
sourcing solution.”5 However, much of the analysis seemed to be only topical results and 
produced thinly supported recommendations. One action item stated, “codify, establish 
measures of effectiveness, and subsequently enforce operational FORGEN cycles across 
all SOF Components in order to provide fully ready, validated and sustainable SOF to the 
Joint Force.”6 Many units already have measures of effectiveness, so why are they not 
following them? Other actions items stated “Publish SOF enterprise-wide leadership and 
accountability leadership lessons learned analogous to U.S. Navy’s Approach magazine 
(aviation community’s lessons learned) in order to identify, analyze and share leadership 
and management situations.”7 While this may be beneficial to addressing some of the 
symptoms within SOCOM, it does not address the underlying root of the problem. Though 
the CR was thorough in addressing observations from their research, many of the findings 
and recommendations fell short of identifying the causal factors. American author and 
inspirational speaker Simon Sinek insists the best path to understanding is to “start with 
 
4 USSOCOM, United States Special Operation Command Comprehensive Review. 
5 27–29. 
6 USSOCOM, 33. 
7 USSOCOM, 37. 
3 
why.”8 The CR arguably answered what was happening within SOCOM and how these 
events potentially led to unethical behavior but failed to accurately determine why these 
events persist.  
This thesis analyzes both the internal and external influences that can affect the 
ethical behavior of special ops forces. This assessment provides evidence that SOCOM 
does indeed have an ethics problem and it directly correlates with their misaligned culture. 
A complex situational environment has negatively contributed to the erosion of intrinsic 
core values and strict adherence to an ethical culture. The internal and external influences 
on the force are perhaps stronger than many previously understood. Inability to understand, 
recognize, or adjust to the influences that shape an organizational culture can significantly 
alter the professional ethic upon which it is built.  
Any recognized profession requires a solid ethical foundation that underpins the 
cultural identity of what is socially and morally right and wrong. The professional ethic is 
the maintaining function of any organization to ensure it operates as intended and within 
the context of society. The “profession of arms” is no different; in fact, as one of the last 
organizations that defend our democracy both in a moral sense and constitutionally, a 
strong sense of ethics is paramount.9 Some may even argue the military, and SOF 
specifically, are held to a higher moral standard simply due to the nature of their 
profession.10 The demands of combat can test the will and moral fortitude of any human 
being. Critical decision-making under extreme duress can surpass the bounds of even the 
most highly trained individuals’ moral development. SOF operators are not immune to this. 
The situational environment many SOF find themselves operating within exacerbate the 
vulnerabilities to unethical misconduct, thus highlighting the need for SOF to be attuned 
to their own moral compass. 
 
8 TEDx Talks, Start with Why—How Great Leaders Inspire Action, video, 2009, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u4ZoJKF_VuA. 
9 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Press, 1957), 11. 
10 J. Carl Ficarrotta, “Are Military Professionals Bound by a Higher Moral Standard?,” Armed Forces 
& Society 24, no. 1 (October 1997): 59–75, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9702400103. 
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B. FORMING THE WARRIOR ETHOS 
Humans’ internal values and beliefs construct the framework from which we base 
our behavior and decisions on. At times unethical behavior is glaringly obvious, while other 
situations are ambiguous. To better understand what is right and why we act, we work to 
define the issues, “systemizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong 
behavior.”11 We continue to categorize behavior and actions in the effort to determine why 
individuals act in a certain way while also analyzing what is acceptable moral behavior and 
what is not.12 Philosophers, while studying normative theory and applied ethics cases, still 
do not fully agree on all facets of human behavior, of course. Psychological theories on 
human cognition are continually evolving. Anthropologists continue to expand their 
research studying human behavior through both cross-cultural studies and evolutionary 
biology. Determining exactly why humans behave in the ethical and unethical ways they 
do, or delivering a final, exhaustive answer as to why certain SOF operators will/can act 
unethically in particular, will not be possible to unpack given these vagaries and 
uncertainties. However, this does not mean we should simply write off any issues of 
misconduct as a bad apple situation or even as part of human nature—failing to 
acknowledge a problem does not make it go away. Rather, one should use the tools of 
science to better understand the problem. Utilizing theories from different fields that study 
human behavior will provide the framework to understand the complex individual and 
organizational challenges within SOF. Building a deeper understanding may not result in 
absolute truths but will provide the systematic approach to philosophical thinking and thus 
offer a more detailed understanding of the professional ethic.13 
Understanding our ethical norms and behaviors is one thing, but effective 
application of scientific theory within social systems and organizations is another. In any 
 
11 Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v “ethics,” accessed March 16, 2021, https://iep.utm.edu/
ethics/. 
12 Bernard Gert and Joshua Gert, “The Definition of Morality,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2020 (Stanford University Press, 2020), https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2020/entries/morality-definition/. 
13 John Haldane and John Arthur, Practical Philosophy: Ethics, Society and Culture (Luton, UK: 
Andrews UK Ltd., 2011), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=744333. 
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profession potential for ethical dilemmas exist. Understanding the loyalties, 
responsibilities, and goals of the organization one can utilize the traditional frameworks of 
normative theory to inform the behavior and decision-making processes of the system, to 
some extent.14 SOCOM is a particularly unique and challenging organization to analyze 
on this front, however, given the contentious ethical claims surrounding its very mission. 
Take, for instance, the act of killing. Most humans would agree that killing of another 
human is morally wrong. But, what if that other human was going to kill you, however, or 
perhaps what if that other human was going to kill ten people if you did not kill them 
first?15 Some non-consequentialist views may insist killing the other human is wrong, in 
all cases, regardless of other humans potentially dying.16 Other non-consequentialist 
approaches, however, will contend that people can be responsible for an unjust harm such 
that they make themselves morally liable to be killed justifiably. Or a consequentialist 
approach may insist that by killing one you have saved the other ten, therefore in this case 
the act was morally permissible—in fact, most consequentialists will argue it would be 
wrong to not kill in order to save the ten.17 Do our moral obligations towards others change 
if the organization itself has a duty to kill in the execution of its very mission? The 
relationship of one’s organization, and our role within it, play on our ethical analysis of 
such cases and is complex. This does not mean ethical restraint and deliberation cannot not 
be applied to SOF operators, of course. Rather, it indicates by virtue of their employment 
ethical and moral judgement might be that much more important.   
C. THE CHALLENGES OF WAR 
SOF operate in the potential gray zone of ethical dilemmas. The moral high ground 
may change dramatically depending on the situation operators find themselves in. In part 
 
14 Haldane and Arthur. 
15 Shannon C. Houck and Meredith A. Repke, “When and Why We Torture: A Review of Psychology 
Research,” Translational Issues in Psychological Science 3, no. 3 (2017): 272–83, https://doi.org/10.1037/
tps0000120. 
16 William Wallace, Kant (Kitchener, Canada: Batoche Books, 1999), 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=3117741. 
17 Seven Pillars Institute, “Normative Ethics,” Seven Pillars Institute, August 2016, 
https://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/glossary/normative-ethics/. 
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to help mitigate these uncertainties, we have international laws and rules of engagement to 
better define what is and what is not acceptable in war. These laws establish the acceptable 
norms of war for society but do little in developing moral judgment of individuals at the 
root level. Simply telling people what they can or cannot do may make them obedient, but 
not virtuous. Individuals gain virtue when they not only understand why they cannot or 
should not do certain acts, but place value in those reasons and act on those right reasons—
that is, they have the moral motivation to do what they determine is right through moral 
deliberation.  
The rules of war define acceptable and legal acts for war, but war is hell and does 
not fit neatly into a nicely packaged box. What if our adversary is unbound by rules? What 
if the case could be made that the rules do not apply to specific adversaries? What about 
the many vague, uncertain, chaotic, ambiguous scenarios that often arise in the fog of war 
that are not covered by a specific rule of engagement (ROE) or international law? Some 
may argue the internal moral judgement of the individual should take over in these cases 
and they will inherently know what is right or wrong. Yet others may suggest anyone who 
believes that has never felt the fog of war. In this instance, the situation has an ability to 
dictate behavior. Acknowledging our environment can impact moral judgment as 
explained by cognitive ethology, which further complicates the analysis of SOF ethics.18 
However, difficult and extreme situational environments are not the only negative 
influences acting upon the SOF professional ethic; there are also internal influences at an 
individual level.  
Human psychology is complex. Not only is it a challenge for scholars to understand 
the individual-level factors that influence human behavior, but this is further complicated 
when accounting for the social influences on individuals. Humans are social beings, 
 
18 Cognitive ethology explains “the fact that cognitive process can change with the situational context 
in which a subject is embedded presents serious challenge to researchers hoping to generalize their work to 
our everyday cognitive lives. Michel Tibayrenc and Francisco J. Ayala, On Human Nature: Biology, 
Psychology, Ethics, Politics, and Religion (San Diego, CA: Elsevier Science & Technology, 2016), 368, 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=4683580. 
7 
evolved to organize and order themselves within social groups.19 Social groups can alter 
the individual ethic and create their own values and norms.20 Social groups function 
through their own principles and beliefs developing unique cultures to form to sustain 
effective cooperation amongst the group. 
D. CULTURAL EVOLUTION 
It is natural for social groups to create their own unique culture. As the group forms, 
individuals begin to assimilate to the group approved values, beliefs, and acceptable 
actions. We see this daily yet think little about how or why they form, and often members 
among cultures take for granted how similar their actions become. Anthropologists would 
suggest that many of the mannerisms, group roles and actions, and behavioral functions of 
today are the product of cultural evolution by way of natural selection.21 
“Culture is reality’s playbook. It is a pattern of shared basic assumptions and norms 
learned by a group as it solves its problems of external adaptation and internal integration. 
It is also ideology in the sense that our cultural lens relies on core notions, reflexive 
suppositions, assumed beliefs, and implicit expectations about the world and our place in 
it.”22 Emile Durkheim describes this as “conscience collective” or “those collective 
representations which bind society together” and create shared practices throughout 
mundane life.23 Culture establishes values and norms, regulates action and behavior 
through rules and laws, and create the unifying function of any group to provide a collective 
identity. To date, anthropologists and sociologists have proposed a myriad of definitions 
 
19 Gavin Kendall and Gary M Wickham, Understanding Culture: Cultural Studies, Order, Ordering 
(London, UK: SAGE Publications, 2001), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/
detail.action?docID=254724. 
20 Daphna Oyserman, “Culture Three Ways: Culture and Subcultures Within Countries,” Annual 
Review of Psychology 68, no. 1 (January 3, 2017): 435–63, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-122414-
033617. 
21 William M. Baum, Understanding Behaviorism: Behavior, Culture, and Evolution (Hoboken, NJ: 
John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2017), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/
detail.action?docID=4774511. 
22 Siamak Naficy, “Feared and Revered Toward an Anthropology of Delinquency,” CTX Journal In 
Press (2021). 
23 Kendall and Wickham, Understanding Culture, 7. 
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for culture; for this thesis, culture should be considered as a “constellation of shared beliefs, 
values, behaviors, and practices” that are “organized around a central theme such as 
individualism, collectivism, or honor.”24 Culture shapes our moral beliefs and influences 
what we think to be our individual identities.25 Culture establishes rules, both written and 
unwritten, to foster cooperation and implant obedience.26 Humans are internally guided 
through their moral beliefs and values, yet these same internal values are in effect shaped 
by the culture they are surrounded by.27 Individual cognition assimilates and adapts to 
group norms, which is important in the practical application of ethics. Groups form their 
own ideals and provide a purpose and significance to the individual enabling cooperation 
which in turn creates function. This leads to the question: if culture can establish acceptable 
behavior and manipulate the individual ethic, what is the culture of SOCOM and how has 
it influenced those within it? The answer is again complex as there are arguably multiple 
cultures in competition within SOCOM.28 
SOCOM should be analyzed as a multi-cultural organization. Although, SOCOM 
could be argued to have a culture, it is comprised of multiple sub-units each with their own 
culture and identity. Navy SEAL culture is arguably different than Army Special Forces; 
both are drastically different than Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), 
which in fact has multiple cultures between Air Force Special Warfare and AFSOC 
commando aircrew. To further complicate the idea of influence, each sub-unit shares a 
relationship with their parent service command and SOCOM. Identifying a singular 
 
24 Angela K.-Y. Leung and Dov Cohen, “Within- and between-Culture Variation: Individual 
Differences and the Cultural Logics of Honor, Face, and Dignity Cultures,” Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 100, no. 3 (March 2011): 2, http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1037/a0022151. 
25 Peter Revay and Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, “Modeling the Co-Evolution of Culture, Signs and 
Network Structure,” in Social, Cultural, and Behavioral Modeling, ed. Dongwon Lee et al., Lecture Notes 
in Computer Science (Springer International Publishing, 2017), 162–71, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-
60240-0_20. 
26 Ann Weatherall and Matthew M. Hollander, Using Discursive Psychology and Conversation 
Analysis to Study “Obedience” and “Defiance” in Milgram’s Experiments (London, UK: SAGE 
Publications Ltd, 2018), https://doi.org/10.4135/9781526449160. 
27 Ágnes Melinda Kovács, Ernő Téglás, and Ansgar Denis Endress, “The Social Sense: Susceptibility 
to Others’ Beliefs in Human Infants and Adults,” Science 330, no. 6012 (December 24, 2010): 1830–34, 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1190792. 
28 Oyserman, “Culture Three Ways.” 
9 
cultural identity to formulate and establish a concrete professional ethic can be a 
challenging process for those within SOCOM. Although, a true analysis of the cultural 
identity is not complete without accounting for social norms and values that act upon 
individuals. Although SOF operators relate to their fellow operators, SOCOM is, of course, 
not insulated from society. Social norms and values of the broader society also heavily 
influence the moral foundation of SOF.29 
The beliefs and values many of these operators hold true are in fact a product of the 
society that raised them. Social identity theory suggests the “social category (e.g., 
nationality, political affiliation, sports team) into which one falls, and to which one feels 
one belongs, provides a definition of who one is in terms of the defining characteristics of 
the category-a-self-definition that is a part of the self-concept.”30 In other words, one’s 
behavior within a group is as much a function of social identity as it is individual identity. 
The idea that an individual can simply change all moral beliefs and values due to joining a 
new group or culture defies logic and science.31 Research suggests the best indicator for 
organizational behavior within smaller social groups is related to the individual 
commitment to group norms and values.32 Merely adopting the values and morals of the 
culture does not make an individual ethical; however, without them there will be no 
development of ethics in the practical sense.33 
 
29 Deborah J. Terry, Michael A. Hogg, and Katherine M. White, “The Theory of Planned Behavior: 
Self-Identity, Social Identity and Group Norms,” The British Journal of Social Psychology 38 (September 
1999): 225–44. 
30 Michael A. Hogg, Deborah J. Terry, and Katherine M. White, “A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical 
Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory*,” Social Psychology Quarterly 58, no. 4 
(December 1995): 5. 
31 Naomi Ellemers and Floor Rink, “Identity in Work Groups: The Beneficial and Detrimental 
Consequences of Multiple Identities and Group Norms for Collaboration and Group Performance,” in 
Social Identification in Groups, ed. Shane R. Thye and Edward J. Lawler, vol. 22, Advances in Group 
Processes (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2005), 1–41, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0882-
6145(05)22001-5. 
32 Henri Tajfel, “Social Identity and Intergroup Behavior,” Social Science Information 13, no. 2 (April 
1, 1974): 65–93, https://doi.org/10.1177/053901847401300204. 
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Acknowledging the role of social identity within cultures is critical for leaders to 
develop functioning identities within any organization. An effective and successful culture 
requires strong leadership, accountability, self-assessment, and constant reflection.34 
Leaders set the standard of conduct through their own ethical behavior, strengthening 
interpersonal relationships amongst their followers, and reinforcing the mechanisms of 
acceptable behavior.35 Individuals must accept the values as their own, believe in the 
purpose of the organization, and be willing to live by the code. As leaders hold subordinates 
accountable, the standard of conduct permeates through the organization and solidifies the 
shared values and assumptions for ethical conduct. Individuals must constantly reassess 
and reflect on their own morals and values, when all individuals hold the shared norms of 
the group higher than their own personal beliefs a collective organizational identity is 
developed creating an effective function for the group.36 Assessing and reflecting on 
cultural performance and effectiveness is important as values and assumptions can change 
over time, this a process of symbolic interactionism.37 Change can result from internal 
influence, such as new leader or commander, or could be from external influence. In all 
aspects of culture, the individual ethic is thought to be influenced by multiple factors, both 
internal and external.  
When attempting to understand ethical challenges within an organization, one must 
first assess the culture. Terry et al. suggest “to understand and predict behavior, it is 
necessary to conceive of the self and the wider social structure as being inextricably linked. 
As well as being influenced by the wider social structure, the self is conceived as an active 
creator of social behavior.”38 Thus, when analyzing ethical misconduct within SOCOM 
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the cultural norms and values become seemingly as important as the individual ethical 
development of each operator. The links between culture and ethics should not be ignored, 
as they are intrinsically linked.  
E. SOCOM: REACTING TO CHANGE 
The complexities of analyzing origins of ethical behavior within a multi-cultural 
organization, such as SOCOM, are extremely challenging. SOCOM is unlike any other 
professional entity in the world. From early uses of special operators in World War II to 
the GWOT, Americans have relied on SOF to execute some of the most daring and complex 
missions to ensure U.S. National Security. Upon its official designation as a U.S. 
Combatant Command in 1987 USSOCOM has remained dedicated to recruiting, assessing, 
selecting, and developing the most elite special operators in the world poised for global 
execution on behalf of U.S. national interests, policy, and security.39 The priorities are 
absolute for SOF operators. As a strategic arm of competition and deterrence for the U.S. 
Government, healthy civilian-military relationships are vital. These relationships share 
reciprocal responsibilities by virtue. Just as SOF has been entrusted by the American 
people to faithfully execute their duties upholding American values, so too has the civilian 
control been entrusted to execute proper control and authority to include the proper use, 
employment, and management of the force. The inability to properly maintain these 
relationships has negatively affected SOCOM in multiple areas. 
Two decades of war have led to an unsustainable demand and growth of a force 
designed to be light and lethal. As SOF has carried the weight of GWOT, they have gone 
from a traditional supporting force to a supported force. The heavy demand has resulted in 
a drastically larger force that struggles to maintain its identity. A once-light mobile force 
now resembles that of their conventional counterparts—overly bureaucratic with a narrow 
focus. Units that once identified with their specially assigned mission now seem to only 
speak counterterrorism (CT). Lost in the shuffle of growth and expansion are those 
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individuals that do not know who or what they belong to anymore; cultural identity is a 
collective mixture and, in some cases, creates a void for sub-cultures to form and persist.  
A combat culture that favors combat tours and global presence over all else has 
seemingly taken over SOCOM.40 Anyone and everyone within the command is entangled 
in an evolving culture that recognizes only one thing: war. Although combat is SOCOM’s 
purpose, it has stifled the development of future human capital to the point a culture without 
it could not be envisioned. Officers and leaders are promoted on their combat prowess, 
regardless of leadership attributes. The devotion to tactical skills has led to leaders lacking 
in strategic thought.41 These sentiments are not merely opinion, but supported by findings 
of the SOCOM CR. The demands of war have challenged leaders’ abilities to balance the 
priorities of the mission over their individuals. Arguably, these leaders are caught in their 
own ethical dilemmas; understanding their decisions could possibly contribute to the 
misuse of their own force while simultaneously failing to identify a suitable alternative. 
This thesis is not to suggest SOCOM leaders knowingly or willingly put undue strain on 
their subordinates, but rather that the culture led many to believe it was the only thing and 
the right thing to do. The organizational culture has promoted the combat culture at the 
expense of properly educating and training down to the team level. The stress on the force 
has been tremendous. A SOF force that has never left the battlefield is starting to show the 
organizational trauma of war.  
The seemingly never-ending war has altered American culture and created a society 
reliant on its military might. Socially, Americans have become attuned to war; it is 
background music that people barely recognize. Social boundaries delineating war and 
peace have become blurry. Americans desire for global prominence has led to the military, 
specifically SOCOM, becoming the international answer to retain American 
exceptionalism regardless of the cost.42 Rosa Brooks, Georgetown law professor and 
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former counselor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, articulates the change in 
society through her book pointedly called How Everything Became War and the Military 
Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon, suggesting American society is more 
comfortable with military action than state diplomacy.43 The societal pressure of American 
exceptionalism has led to increased risk, exposure, and reliance on SOF as the new scalpel 
of foreign policy.44 American societies demand for prominence has not only increased 
SOF exposure on the battlefield, but within the public spotlight as well.  
SOCOM involvement in the public sphere may be in part of their own doing as 
some SOF seek to capitalize on their brand. Movies, books, podcasts, political pundits all 
clamor for their chance to commodify a force that once believed in the motto “quiet 
professional”.45 SOF individuals’ desire to sell their stories may be a driving force to the 
public demanding it. The increased public notoriety has created identity conflicts within 
some SOCOM units as well as increased public exposure to public scrutiny.46 A once 
renowned organization known through stories of heroism in combat has recently found 
itself defending a reputation against stories of war crimes and unethical conduct. The 
increased public scrutiny should lead some to wonder if there is an ethics problem in SOF, 
or a perception problem with SOF? The answer is likely both, and both can arguably be 
attributed to a misguided culture. A culture that will need to realign not only to regain 
public trust, but to ensure a transition to future conflicts.  
The assumption of future conflict for U.S. forces will likely see a departure from 
CT focus and a steadfast focus on great powers competition (GPC).47 The rise of nation 
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states such as China and Russia have forced political and SOCOM leaders to reassess SOF 
focus for future capability. The transition will likely require a shift in mindset as well as 
capability. An organization that has been entrenched in the CT fight for twenty years will 
likely take some time to retrofit a force for a completely new battlefield. The transition will 
force SOCOM to realign their culture to one focused on the future and away from the past.  
A shifting force for tomorrow should understand the affects from the force of 
yesterday. As the culture of SOF has changed, so too has its ethical foundation. As these 
two factors are undoubtedly linked, it is unlikely the force can definitively state there are 
no ethical issues within SOCOM will admitting to cultural issues. This thesis will not 
definitively determine all the causal reasons why individuals act unethically but will 
demonstrate there are multiple factors of influence that can contribute to unethical 
behavior. The future of SOF is not lost. In fact, many SOF operators still live by a higher 
moral code that many could ever truly understand. Their legacy should not be tarnished by 
the acts of few; however, unless SOCOM can refocus an eroding culture and realign the 
values of their operators a stained legacy may inevitably become a reality. 
15 
II. A GROWING FANTASY: HOW SPECIAL OPS BECAME THE 
WEAPON OF CHOICE FOR THE POLITICAL ELITE 
A. EARLY COMMANDOS 
Wars have existed in society for centuries as a means for political ends.48 Wars 
have reduced empires, toppled governments, and shifted the dominance of power 
throughout the world. The battlefield is ever evolving and complex, it is the “province of 
uncertainty,” according to Clausewitz.49 Those that seek the advantage in war must first 
be able to reduce the fog and friction of war. This is accomplished not by might but by 
intellect, courage, temperament, and character.50 It is the embodiment of these talents with 
a degree of virtuosity that mark a highly developed warrior, Clausewitz refers to this as 
“military genius”.51 The incessant desire to develop such military genius is much like the 
battlefield, ever evolving. A force that quickly and easily adapts to the changing 
environments is ascendant in the eyes of the political elite. The pursuit of such highly 
developed and intellectual military genius has come in the way of special operations forces. 
A specifically tailored and selected group of military professionals designed and developed 
to operate in extreme and undefined environments. As noted by Admiral William McRaven 
in his book Spec Ops, “spec ops reduce warfare to the simplest level and limit negative 
effects of chance and uncertainty, whereas large conventional forces are more susceptible 
to the friction of war.”52 Precisely trained, SOF skill sets are niche; the embrace of intellect 
and innovation enables their combat advantage. 
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Seeking any advantage in a highly complex war, World War II was the catalyst that 
prodded U.S. leaders to embrace a specialized method of combat. The U.S. Office of 
Strategic Studies (OSS) began assessing the development of a special corps of men 
specifically trained for clandestine and covert operations. The initial assessment found 
intelligence along with “responsibility, initiative, and common sense” as core traits of a 
successful operator.53 The OSS initiated their training program modeled after the British 
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). The process was physically demanding and included 
selective training for specialized skills to include weapons training, espionage, sabotage, 
and ordinance disposal.54 The OSS operators were highly successful throughout WWII 
and continued to be a national strategic asset utilized by the U.S. Government for years to 
come until it would formally become known as the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947.55 
However, the use of special tactics was not exclusive to the OSS in WWII. Political and 
military leaders alike recognized the strategic advantage to employing conventional assets 
to conduct specialized missions.  
The U.S. began to envision the strategic advantage to empowering unconstrained 
innovation down to individual tactical units. A bold new concept to support British troops 
deep into Japanese held territory in the China-Burma-India theatre of WWII was developed 
and executed by the first Air Commando Group.56 The U.S. air groups objective was to 
covertly penetrate deep behind Japanese lines in order to cut off Japanese communication 
routes, resupply British soldiers, and fortify strategic locations.57 Operation Thursday, as 
it came to be known, boasted many firsts in combat: it was the first time wounded had been 
evacuated by aircraft from enemy territory, first night glider assault landing, first use of 
 
53 Office of Strategic Studies, Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for Clandestine Operations 
(Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1948), 12. 
54 Office of Strategic Studies, Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for Clandestine Operations. 
55 John Whiteclaw Chambers, “Office of Strategic Services Training During World War II,” Studies in 
Intelligence 54 (2010). 
56 Herbert Mason, Randy Bergeron, and James Renfrow, Operation Thursday: Birth of Air 
Commandos (Wright Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force History Museum Project, 1994). 
57 Mason, Bergeron, and Renfrow. 
17 
helicopters in combat, first air invasion into enemy territory to name only a few.58 
Operation Thursday illustrated the strategic advantage to empowering autonomous 
innovation within a unit. The success of the air commando group not only established what 
is now AFSOC, but directly influenced the use of special operations for future combat 
operations.59 The innovative solution to a strategic problem verified the potential for 
success in WWII. Politicians recognized the untapped potential and sought to capitalize on 
its value and Vietnam provided the ideal environment to promote a future with SOF. 
Vietnam was a vastly different war than WWII. U.S. forces, structured to engage 
in conventional combat, were again faced with strategic problems in a protracted 
unconventional war. Conventional armies were replaced with guerrilla fighters hidden in 
the jungle; the environment had adapted. Conventional forces were cumbersome, lacked 
flexibility, and carried large logistical and bureaucratic burdens, a direct contrast to the 
guerrilla force they were facing. Again, political leaders turned to special operations to 
provide solutions. President John F. Kennedy was convinced a smaller, elite force 
specifically tailored for unconventional warfare was the answer, thus the Army Special 
Forces (SF) were born.60 Bred from OSS tactics and training, Army SF played a pivotal 
role in targeting guerrilla fighters deep in enemy territory. Land forces were not the only 
combat capability, however; U.S. leaders understood they must regain the advantage in all 
domains including water. 
Marine maritime assault failures early in the war highlighted the need for 
specialized maritime units. Navy Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) had been 
established in WWII, but rarely used in the tactical environment. UDTs lacked experience 
and training to precisely execute a special mission set. A greater level of selection and 
specialized training would be required to fulfill President Kennedy’s need in Vietnam, thus 
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the Navy SEALs were officially established in 1962.61 SEAL training was physically and 
mentally challenging, accessing and accepting only the best of those suited to conduct 
maritime warfare.62 SEALs trained Vietnamese forces for clandestine maritime ops, then 
transitioned to scouting and recon for U.S. forces, inevitably by 1964 due to war escalation 
SEALs were conducting maritime assaults on their own.63 The transformation signified 
the value of stringent selection and training. The pursuit of the military genius had taken 
shape in the form of SOF providing the political elite a new solution to their toughest 
problems.  
SOF generated a new concept of foreign diplomacy for political leaders, 
perceptually becoming the easy button to solve any foreign issue. Special operations troops 
found themselves spread out executing anything that resembled counter insurgency 
(COIN), from the Philippines to training Bolivian soldiers that would later defeat Che 
Guevara’s army of insurgents.64 Clear and defined mission sets along with transparency 
of standards and expectations were key to initial success. However, integrating SOF into a 
joint force proved to be the biggest challenge, one that would culminate in one of the worst 
failures by special operations forces to date. 
B. BIRTH OF SOCOM 
The need to utilize a special mission force quickly emerged when fifty-two 
Americans were taken from the U.S. Embassy in Iran and held hostage by Iranian 
Revolutionary supporters. Delta Force, a new unit of elite soldiers had recently been 
created. Specially selected and trained to combat the growing threat of terrorism with a 
niche for hostage rescue, Delta was a unit unmatched by its SOF counterparts.65 The 
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hostage rescue, named Operation Eagle Claw would be their first real combat experience, 
and joint interoperability their first real challenge. 
Operation Eagle Claw was one of the most complex and daring rescue attempts 
ever conducted by U.S. SOF. Due to operation security (OPSEC) reasons initial planning 
was convoluted and compartmentalized; of all service components involved only a few 
handpicked staff planners knew of the upcoming mission. Execution would be overly 
complex, encompassing SOF and conventional forces from every service branch. The 
distance covered, operating environment, necessity of multiple air, ground, and sea assets, 
along with the dynamic nature of combat and friction of war proved too much for the force. 
While refueling at a desert laager site, a maneuvering helicopter hit a static C-130 refueler 
killing eight people and leaving carnage in the Desert. The mission was aborted with no 
Americans rescued. The mission attempt is to this day one of the biggest failures the SOF 
community has endured. The causal factor for the failure was pinned on the inoperability 
of the joint forces.66 
The need for a joint service command was abundantly clear. A 1985 staff report to 
the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate stated “the integration inside the 
Department of Defense (DOD) needs changed, this due to an internal review of all DOD 
components. Integration due to multiple factors is strained, a need for a joint service 
command is necessary.”67 Interservice rivalry and competition for budgets and resources 
resulted in service chiefs wielding their power to create a hostile bureaucratic process.68 
The DOD had underwent minimal changes in the past century, the system to ensure 
oversight and compliance was dysfunctional and inadequate.69 The Goldwater-Nichols 
Act of 1986 was enacted, a DOD reorganization that would focus priorities on 
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interoperability and joint functions and create the United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) in April of 1987.70 This reorganization would lead to one of the 
most dominant and lethal special operations organizations in the world; an organization 
that may have inevitably grown to be a victim of their own success. 
Operation Eagle Claw was a stain on the SOF community’s reputation and 
potentially a bigger stain on the political careers of those that ordered it. President Jimmy 
Carter lost his reelection the following year, many including President Carter insinuating 
that the failed rescue attempt and the inability to bring Americans home as the main 
reason.71 Arguably, many believe had the mission been a success President Jimmy Carter 
would have been easily reelected. Thus, recognizing an intrinsic link between the political 
elite and elite warriors exits. Not simply through combat application, but also through 
public perception and approval. Since the conceptual idea of employing special units in 
combat, political leaders have been drawn to the conceivable advantage. As SOCOM 
matured as an organization, their successes grew, and failures were arguably eliminated. 
Politicians demand for more naturally increased. The relationship appeared to be mutually 
beneficial; politicians could garner support from their base for having the courage to 
execute such daring missions and SOF’s reputation and influence expanded both in and out 
of the DOD.72 However, the relationship is intricate and requires reciprocity; misaligned 
values or motives could have adverse effects when the relationship is not properly 
managed.  
C. CIVIL MILITARY AFFAIRS: THE FANTASY OF SPECIAL 
OPERATIONS 
USSOCOM exists as a means to provide national security to the citizens of the 
United States as an instrument of policy; this relationship is simple in its terms as SOCOM 
and other services in the DOD are obedient to the needs of the society in which it serves 
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and that the society reciprocates their obligation to the military members themselves.73 
The principle reason for the U.S. DOD remaining under civilian control is simple: to ensure 
the military adheres to the needs of the people and not the other way around. Samuel 
Huntington, an American political scientist, described this relationship in detail with his 
book The Soldier and the State.74 Huntington believed the true and only professionals, the 
officers, have multiple obligations and responsibilities to maintaining the relationship with 
the state, one of them prescribed is the ethical conduct of war.75 This obligation is key to 
maintaining the trust of the American people.  
Trust of the American public is critical to SOF’s survival. This trust starts with 
honest and transparent advice provided to civilian leaders and ends with the ethical conduct 
of war.76 Trust, loyalty, and obedience are imperative, as Huntington states, to ensure the 
professional ethic is upheld.77 Americans want to know highly influential military leaders 
are accurately assessing and advising political leaders on the proper use of the force. They 
want to know the military leaders are advocating a path away from conflict and not war 
mongers trying to find it.78 If war is unavoidable, the American public expects those 
representing them to act ethically; avoiding atrocities or savage acts that would reflect 
poorly on American values and culture. Without trust, there is no relationship. Trust must 
also be reciprocated. Civic leaders also have a duty to the American public and SOCOM 
leaders to ensure the employment of troops is ethical and calculated. 
Politicians should carefully examine their urge to utilize SOF in combat; the 
decision to conduct special warfare should only be made out of necessity and not out of 
romantic desires. Although Americans want to believe any decision to engage SOF in 
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combat is made purely out of necessity, this may not always be true. Political scientist 
Elliot Cohen warned of this in 1978 in his book Politicians and Commandos stating “elite 
units of guerrilla, counterguerrilla, and commando type offer politicians in democracies 
both a tool of policy and source of fantasy.”79 Cohen insists the political elite form a 
romantic connection between themselves and the warrior; the glory and honor displayed 
by the warrior is reflected in the elitist actions.80 The instant gratification of employing 
special operators brings about success for the politician and the American people all while 
SOF becomes the American hero.81 The idea of fantasy is rooted not only in the 
employment, but creation. President Kennedy is believed to have officially created Army 
Special Forces and Navy SEALs in Vietnam as a reflection of his own prestigious 
reputation.82 This form of engagement is not only irresponsible but leads to the potential 
of overuse and over reliance on SOF. 
The biggest danger to SOF culture is the misuse of SOF.83 Special operations 
forces are unique, purpose-built organizations specialized in niche mission sets. SOF 
provide politicians with unique capabilities to achieve “military, political, economic, or 
psychological objectives by unconventional means.”84 Overextending these assets to cover 
missions or policy initiatives that could be accomplished by a larger conventional force 
should be considered misuse of SOF. A 1997 Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
report to congress on the ‘Opportunities to Preclude the Misuse of SOF’ stated over 60% 
of the Army, 56% of the Navy, and 86% of the Air Force felt “readiness has been, or 
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threatens to be, adversely affected by the current level of unit deployments.”85 There were 
multiple disparities cited to include utilizing conventional forces in many of the roles SOF 
were currently being deployed to fill such as embassy support or combat search and 
rescue.86 The report concluded the pace of “SOF operations needed to be measured and 
assessed relative to national security objectives” along with “identification of the factors 
that cause SOF personnel to be deployed in excess of established deployment goals.”87 
Civilian leaders should have recognized at that time the need for an educated consumer 
that would deliberately request and or employ special operations forces in the exact roles 
upon which they were designed.88  
D. THE CRUX OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
Elliot Cohen may have foreseen the future in 1978 when he stated “The future of 
elite units should be built on the understanding for their existence strict need and use. They 
should not be used for every solution, a scalpel and not a chainsaw.”89 U.S. politicians 
have arguably done exactly the opposite. The warnings from 1978 have seemingly been 
ignored, the impact of a congressional body that misunderstood the proper use of a national 
asset has placed a heavy demand on a force designed to be light and flexible. The increased 
demand has caused SOF to balloon in size while oversight remains convoluted.  
SOCOM was never intended to be its own service command. So, what happens 
when it grows to become one? A healthy balance of advocacy and oversight are critical to 
organizational effectiveness. U.S. Government organizations are not the exception to this, 
rather the rule. Yet, SOCOM lacks in both advocacy and oversight. Why might this be? 
The relationship is complicated. SOCOM, a Unified Combatant Command, is 
unlike any other service branch, developed as a supporting force to conduct only select 
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mission sets. Service components (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps) have a defined 
command structure. All services report to a civilian secretary that is subordinate to the 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). Civilian secretaries are instrumental in providing policy 
advice, oversight, and a direct advocate for their service regarding resources and 
readiness.90 SOCOM’s command structure is fundamentally different as they are not a 
component command. There is no service secretary to advocate and advise policy or assign 
appropriate oversight. Instead, SOCOM reports to the SECDEF for tasking authority while 
their civilian oversight is established through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC), who reports to the undersecretary 
of defense for policy.91 This may have been sufficient upon SOCOM’s inception serving 
as a much smaller Combatant Command, but is this sufficient for a force that is operating 
much like a service component today? Undoubtedly the answer was no, and the 2017 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) set out to change the reporting structure to 
realign SOCOM.92 The issue, however, has been in the challenges of implementation. 
The inability to fully enact the changes of the 2017 NDAA approving the ASD SO/
LIC to directly report to the SECDEF has prolonged appropriate oversight issues of 
SOCOM. A 2019 GAO report for improved congressional oversight found the 
recommended oversight improvements listed in National Defense Authorization Act of 
2017 had yet to be completed, no timelines to implement the recommendations had been 
established, and roles and responsibilities were unclear.93 Fulfillment of most actions were 
completed, however, by 2020 appointing the ASD SO/LIC with direct reporting to the 
Secretary of Defense; this action would make reporting in line with other service 
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branches.94 The shift remains convoluted. For example, the issue of SOCOM command 
relationship was still lingering in a March 2021 congressional hearing on SOF Culture and 
Climate: The Future of the Force. Witnesses testified the structural changes were yet to be 
fully implemented and without these changes SOCOM civilian leadership was still 
inadequate to advocate for SOCOM policy initiatives, oversight issues, or overall readiness 
concerns.95 To further complicate the relationship, newly appointed SECDEF Lloyd 
Austin reversed previous moves to elevate the ASD SO/LIC reporting and repositioned it 
back within the policy shop. The ASD SO/LIC would report directly to Austin “on 
administrative issues such as manning, training, and equipping the force” only.96 The 
recent move has been viewed by critics as a way to reduce civilian oversight of SOCOM 
and preclude SOCOM from becoming a component service command; avoiding the 
bureaucratic and civilian control that would come with it.97 
Oversight is not a welcomed term within a SOCOM community that values 
autonomy and innovation to secure the advantage. Arguably, within the last twenty years 
SOCOM has enjoyed a degree of autonomy with regards to congressional oversight. 
Autonomy in execution is not a bad thing for SOF. Navy SEAL Lieutenant Commander 
William McRaven (subsequently Admiral McRaven, commander of USSOCOM) 
recounted Army SF units sent to fight the guerrilla resistance in North Luzon Philippines, 
finding initial bureaucracy and oversight rendered the unit ineffective.98 However, once 
granted autonomy with the access to resources, the unit flourished.99 Conversely, limited 
oversight with absolute autonomy can create adverse organizational affects. Oversight is 
the function to maintain accountability. A driving mechanism that spurs continued self-
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regulation, something the SOCOM CR indicated was lacking within SOCOM. 
Accountability is healthy for an organization, one of Huntington’s notable attributes of a 
professional organization.100 Accountability and self-regulation is much like trust, 
however, in that it must go both ways.  
Inability to hold civilian leaders accountable, or a lacking perception of self-
regulation within the government erodes the trust of the American public and the military 
forces they govern equally. Politicians seemingly have transformed from being official’s 
representative of their constituents to a perceived elite social class. “With great power 
comes great responsibility.”101 Overextending SOF forces, mishandling forces, or failing 
to provide adequate oversight to include managing the health of the force are all examples 
of irresponsibility. Failing to hold individuals accountable for known issues of 
irresponsibility will not endow accountability at the lower levels, in fact the opposite is 
likely. The political elite have a great amount of influence on those they command, should 
we believe their subordinates will behave differently than those appointed over them?  
In both congressional mandated reviews of SOCOM, analysts stated they examined 
the factors internal and external to the force, yet none of them have mentioned a link 
between civilian leaders and commandos. Perhaps, this was an attempt to avoid conflict 
with the very people that requested the review, or previous researchers did not believe a 
link existed. Regardless, the internal influence of politicians should be acknowledged when 
addressing the culture of SOF. A power-based relationship requires abundant trust and 
responsibility to be truly affective.102 Politicians have placed heavy demands on SOF over 
the past two decades, arguably more than the organization was designed to take. Obedient 
to the cause, SOF continued to meet the demand with success. It could be said, SOF has 
been their own worst enemy. A tradition of success has only brought more work to the 
force that is already frayed at every seem. Civilian leaders over reliance on SOF, stemming 
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from either necessity or fantasy, coupled with dysfunctional command relationships, 
deficient oversight, and lack of self-regulation has directly influenced the growth and 
demand on SOF today. These factors directly contribute to a fractured SOCOM culture, 
one in which the professional ethic should be built upon. 
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III. ORGANIZATIONAL GROWTH 
A. A COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
USSOCOM has predominantly carried the weight of fighting the War on Terror. 
U.S. Army Special Forces were among the first U.S. troops into Afghanistan in 2001, 
working alongside CIA officers to track down the Taliban leadership. The flexibility of 
SOF and their adaptability to unconventional means proved initially successful in hunting 
down and defeating Taliban leaders. As U.S. strategy began to shift, however, U.S. political 
leaders turned their attention to eradicating Al Qaeda and the continued hunt for Osama 
Bin Laden. Their weapon of choice was again U.S. SOF. The weight and responsibility of 
the war since that time has only increased and resulted in a substantially larger special ops 
force today.  
As the demand increases and troop numbers rise, many questioned whether 
SOCOM leaders even believe their own truths anymore; one being that “Special 
Operations Force cannot be mass produced.”103 Since 2001, the growth of SOF has 
ballooned to arguably unsustainable levels. SOCOM manpower has nearly doubled, 
increasing from 42,800 in 2001 to over 70,000 troops today.104 The budget has tripled—
an increase from $3 billion in 2001 to over $9 billion today.105 SOF deployments have 
increased dramatically, quadrupling in the past twenty years as SOF now has a footprint in 
over 90 countries throughout the world.106 The increase in both manning and funding do 
nothing to deter the over use or over reliance on SOF, rather, they lead to the expectation 
of doing more. In 2006, a Quadrennial Defense Review Report ordered USSOCOM to 
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grow by 15% to meet global demand and requirements.107 General J.F. Mulholland, 
commander of U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) from 2008–2012 
stated his command “could only satisfy about 50% of the demand out there.”108 The 
demand to grow the force comes at a cost. James Kiras points out “when special operations 
forces have been used tactically against numerically superior foes, the response historically 
has been to expand the organizations at the expense of overall quality.”109 Diminished 
quality, in the case of SOCOM, has manifested in the bureaucratic processes and 
organizational management. USSOCOM has grown into an organization it was never 
intended to be. 
Special operations forces provide a flexible option to policy makers, enabling 
adaptable maneuverability throughout the spectrum of combat operations. An organization 
bogged down with bureaucracy restricts the freedom of movement and diminishes the 
innovative employment of special tactics.110 Edward Luttwak argued in his article, Notes 
on Low-Intensity Warfare, that while SOF forces require a certain level of autonomy to be 
effective, reduced bureaucracy was the advantage to employing special operations over 
conventional forces.111 In its inception, SOCOM was focused on the joint integration of 
small-scale forces designed for agile employment and quick results. Much of SOF’s initial 
success is attributed to its small size and a culture focused on specialized core mission sets, 
something that would change in the post 9/11 era.112 
Since 9/11, SOF seems to be the answer to most all foreign policy problems. Edgar 
Schein, MIT Sloan School of Management professor, describes this as the basic underlying 
assumptions of the organization: “when a solution works repeatedly we take it for granted” 
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and the solution simply becomes “dominant value orientations.”113 However, the dominant 
orientations of SOCOM has had dramatic effects on the culture as SOF grew the 
expectations and mission sets grew as well. Susan Marquis warned of this in her book 
Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces (1997) stating that 
one of the biggest threats to SOF was “over broadening, losing flexibility, losing 
responsiveness” and that once SOF broadens the focus to other missions it will lose focus 
on the unifying command.114 SOF requires institutional autonomy, yet must be controlled 
and specifically employed only for their niche, avoiding unnecessary missions.115 
However, within the past five years, USSOCOM has absorbed additional responsibilities 
as the DOD’s main authority countering violent extremist organizations (CVEO), 
countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and transregional military information 
support operations.116 A force that was once the master of the niche has become more of 
the jack of all trades. The focus has begun to depart from specially suited units for specific 
missions.117 The creation and addition of mission sets combined with unsustainable 
growth has resulted in lacking operational management and inadequate bureaucratic 
processes, further affecting the cultural foundation of SOF. 
B. LOSING IDENTITY  
Bureaucratic processes to manage the larger force and additional mission sets have 
become overly cumbersome and ineffective. The 2011 Pressure on the Force and Family 
study found SOCOM did not have an appropriate process to monitor its troops personnel 
tempo (PERSTEMPO).118 Although special operators had been relied on heavily and 
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deployed in record levels for over ten years, the command was found to be inadequate in 
appropriately monitoring how often and for how long each individual spent away from 
their home station. In a 2016 congressional hearing before the House Armed Services 
Committee, then SOCOM commander, General Joseph Votel stated, “we have continued 
to pay a lot of attention to our PERSTEMPO of our deployed members, and we, over the 
last couple of years, with the support of Congress, have been able to get a good process in 
place where we can manage our PERSTEMPO much better now, so we understand what 
the deployment tempo of our people are.”119 USSOCOM appeared to be improving its 
processes until a 2018 GAO report found the DOD along with USSOCOM “did not have 
complete and reliable data to monitor PERSTEMPO.”120 Two years later, the USSOCOM 
CR indicated the process still was not fixed citing “accountability of force employment are 
insufficient to accurately account for valid requirements, commitments, actual deployed 
forces, and define sustainable capacity.”121 
The inability to appropriately manage the force after twenty years of constant 
deployments does little to build trust amongst organizational leaders with their civilian 
superiors and subordinates alike. The mismanagement may also indicate other 
organizational issues. Schein describes culture is built around multiple factors called 
primary embedding mechanisms, one such factor is “what leaders pay attention to, 
measure, and control (or what leader do not pay attention to).”122 If SOF operators have 
been constantly deployed for twenty years and the DOD had still not found a way to 
measure or track the data, this may indicate it was something leaders chose not to pay 
attention to. The mismanagement of people is not only apparent in its deployment tracking 
at the organizational level, mismanagement of missions and teams have also impacted the 
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special ops community. The bifurcation of missions and roles without concrete community 
focus has resulted in an identity crisis and fractured culture.  
Cultural identity is created through clearly defined roles and responsibilities with 
shared goals and established standards of conduct and behavior. As USSOCOM has 
continued to broaden its mission and method of employment, a fractured identity is 
appearing throughout the command down to the team level. The shift of identity is directly 
correlated with the changing culture of SOF operators. Colonel Edward Croot, an Army 
Special Forces officer, noted the impacts of mission drift in his master’s thesis titled There 
is an identity crisis in Special Forces: Who are the Green Berets supposed to be?.123 Croot 
conducted a survey of over 1,200 active-duty SF members to “measure misalignment 
between established and actual organizational identity” within SF.124 Croot found 
“strategic shifts over the last two decades have changed expectations of SF, and these 
changes are influencing the culture, behavior, and employment of Green Berets.”125 Green 
Berets, traditionally focused on foreign internal defense (FID), have been used in various 
roles throughout the GWOT. The broadening of roles caused uncertainty and confusion 
amongst SF members. Croot’s data demonstrated there are three distinct subgroups within 
SF: those that identify with a direct action (DA) identity, those with a legacy identity, and 
almost half that have formed their own modern identity.126 The concept of sub-identities 
is consistent with Schein’s cultural models explaining “with growth will come 
differentiation into various subgroups, which will, over time, evolve in their own cultures 
requiring new responses from the organization.”127 The fragmentation within SF has 
caused subsets of values and shared assumptions amongst individuals without a guiding 
mechanism to center the organization. The cultural issues seem to be consistent with the 
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latest CR as well, and likely not secluded to SF.128 Many of the cultural issues SOCOM is 
experiencing have their roots in the recruitment, selection, and assessment of special 
operators.  
Identifying the right people is essential to any high functioning organization. 
Recruiting, selecting, and assessing individuals to fill special operator roles is a necessity 
for SOCOM and one of the most important aspects to building a unified culture. 
Assessment and selection reinforce and define the groups boundaries, becomes a consensus 
among the group of who is in and who is out.129 The clear delineation of what is expected 
to enter the group implants the defined values of the group and culture collectively. 
However, what happens when a group is forced to grow beyond the means of adequately 
assessing and selecting the individuals? This was the focus of recent congressional research 
when they posed the question to USSOCOM how much larger the organization could grow 
before modifying standards to account for the larger force?130  
Pressure to produce additional special operators can have detrimental effects on the 
organizational culture. Much like what the Green Berets are currently experiencing, when 
individuals are allowed to enter the group with prior assumptions and beliefs inconsistent 
with the organizational core values, then smaller subgroups will appear.131 As more 
subgroups exist within an organization, the collective identity shared amongst members 
begins to shift, allowing norms and values to permeate the organization that are 
incongruent with overall organizational espoused values.132The mass production of SOF, 
however, has resulted in multiple organizational issues that erode the identity and culture 
of today’s special operators.  
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IV. PROMOTING A CULTURE OF WAR 
A. AN ORGANIZATION STUCK IN WAR 
Organizational culture is shaped and cultivated by the shared beliefs and 
assumptions of the group. It is what leaders pay attention to, what they communicate and 
promote both verbally and non-verbally.133 Shared values and beliefs create the group 
identity and influence the ethical foundation of the entire organization. Edgar Schein 
believed “culture begins with leaders who impose their own values and assumptions on a 
group.”134 Simply put, the shared values and ethical culture of the operators at the bottom 
of the chain, or team level, are a direct reflection of the commanding officers and civil 
leaders imposing their own values and assumptions over them. Therefore, to better 
understand the cultural issues within SOCOM it is important to first examine what SOCOM 
leaders’ values are and how they shape a culture within SOF. 
“Humans are more important than hardware” and “quality is better than quantity” 
- two SOF truths that prescribe institutional values and assumptions for SOCOM.135 Senior 
leaders often quote these truths; posture statements, speeches, and even congressional 
testimony regularly emphasize these values as concrete. Gen Joseph Votel, Commander 
USSOCOM from 2014–2016, reinforced these sentiments when he stated before the House 
Armed Services Committee in 2015 the top priority of SOCOM: “First, we must ensure 
SOF readiness by developing the right people, skills, and capabilities to meet future—
current and future requirements. To this end, we want to ensure effectiveness now and into 
the future with the very best SOF operators and support personnel enabled by the best 
technology and capabilities we can field.”136 Developing and retaining human capital has 
been and remains at the forefront of many SOF leaders’ minds as it is the direct link to 
future readiness and combat effectiveness. Current SOCOM commander, Army General 
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Richard Clark, recently re-emphasized the importance of human capital stating “the 
foundations of SOCOM readiness is our superior assessment, selection, training, education 
and talent management.”137 The expressed emphasis on operator health and readiness is 
positive. Thus, the issue within SOF culture is not what is said in principle, but rather what 
is done (or not done) in practice.  
Organizations that focus solely on the ends tends to neglect the means; the product 
becomes more important than the process. Corporations have understood this concept for 
some time. Focusing only on profit can erode the culture of the organization and lead to 
reduced workforce morale while bleeding organizational talent to other competitors.138 In 
the case of SOCOM, war is the product and a narrow focus on this has caused the 
organizational process of developing those that conduct it to suffer. Deployments and 
combat experience became the benchmark upon which individuals were measured and 
promoted. The broadening and development of human capital was impeded by a 
disproportionate focus on combat. Mismanaged processes increased the bureaucratic thrash 
and pushed many operators out.139The misguided focus resulted in a force that overvalued 
a culture of combat while failing to recognize the impact on its own people.  
War became the culture for special operators. Growth to the potential detriment of 
foundational truths, or values, became the norm, combat the standard, and number of 
deployments the measurement criteria. An institutional bias towards combat was created. 
Those with tactical skill and combat experience formed the in-group while those officers 
and leaders that wished to accept career broadening opportunities away from the battlefield 
were largely cast to the out-group.140 Senior leaders accentuated the bias both by action 
and inaction; either creating additional deployment billets themselves or failing to vet 
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current SOF deployment billets.141 Deployment taskings were specifically written to gain 
or retain SOF forces regardless of necessity.142 Requirements specified a SOF activity (e.g. 
CT), knowing that the ultimate intent upon deployment into theatre was to use that force 
as either presence, or for another SOF activity (e.g. FID).”143 Deployment billets were not 
validated between cycles to confirm the continued need or use.144 High operations tempo 
became normalized behavior, lending to the underlying assumption that it is just what SOF 
does and what they signed up for. Arguably, senior leaders did not knowingly or 
intentionally mismanage their organizations operations tempo. However, as demands 
increased perhaps the combat culture was the natural reaction to a force that does not say 
no. Regardless, combat culture has had cascading effects throughout the force. 
Implementing the commands main priorities of human capital development has been 
challenging in part due to promoting the combat culture that disrupts it. 
In a recent Pew Research Poll 61% of officers and 57% of non-commissioned 
officers believed deployments were a positive factor in their advancement in the 
military.145 If group members can correlate career advancement and promotion with 
combat experience, whether the phenomenon be real or perceived, then a categorical 
assessment is made that the two are inter-related. The relationship provides the motivation 
to promote a continued combat culture. The motivation may also explain the willingness 
to create and fill additional deployment billets while justifying the cost to the force out of 
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necessity regardless of futility.146 The CR stated “USSOCOM must manage the 
institutional bias towards employment, and reclaim resources for investment in other key 
areas, by applying leadership, discipline and accountability to force employment processes 
and business rules.”147 This statement is critical as it potentially defines exactly what 
SOCOM is not doing that led to the combat culture; SOCOM not only motivates leaders to 
promote the culture, it discourages them to challenge it. 
To counter a motivation SOCOM leaders need to reinforce the behavior they do 
want. Reinforcement, both positive and negative, tends to be most effective method to 
encourage acceptable behavior.148 The SOCOM CR found, to some degree, the opposite 
was happening. Leaders were not held accountable for failing to develop their human 
capital at the expense of countless deployments, they were positively rewarded with 
promotions. On the contrary, a perception exists that if you do go against the current culture 
you will be punished or reprimanded. Rosa Brooks refers to this as a “zero defect culture,” 
insinuating SOCOM has created a culture that rewards conformity and punishes 
creativity.149 Although leaders’ “campaign on flexibility and innovation, nothing 
changes.”150 Readiness and combat became the absolutes. Any perceived obstacles or 
barriers to these priorities should be remedied at the lowest levels, if not those leaders 
responsible may then be held accountable. Accountability in this case negatively reinforces 
the behavior SOCOM leaders do want. Meghann Meyers supports this idea in her Military 
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Times article Special Operations Has and Entitlement Problem, Here’s how they intend to 
fix it claiming, “in practice, leaders often hesitate to deal with a problem, either because 
they are afraid of punching a hole in their formation and blowing their readiness for combat, 
or because they are afraid that misconduct in their formation will be a black mark on their 
career advancement.”151 The behavior SOCOM leaders have positively reinforced created 
a culture prone to combat. However, the counter to this idea is that society should want 
SOCOM focused on war, it is their job. Why not promote a combat culture? If SOCOM is 
not focused on tactical prowess and lethality then what should it be focused on?  
Promoting combat proven leaders is not the measurement criteria out of fantasy, 
but a matter of necessity. To effectively fight and win on the battlefield, you select and 
promote leaders that are capable or fighting and winning wars. Leaders begin to be chosen 
or promoted based on their tactical prowess and combat experience regardless of their 
overall leadership ability.152 SOF operators want to be surrounded by the best and if 
combat is the only thing valued then the person with the most experience is highly sought 
after. Combat is a struggle for survival, you fight or face cultural extinction. The 
evolutionary forces favoring heroism in combat is the reason combat proven leaders are 
essential to the combat culture—they provide the reassurance of survival.153 To a degree, 
this evidence all supports promoting combat leaders and war culture is not to the detriment 
of SOCOM; however, if not properly managed the culture has potential to extend beyond 
the bounds of altruistic motivations into a culture of unethical misconduct. SOF should be 
focused on tactical excellence, but not to the detriment of developing future human capital. 
The success of SOCOM relies on a holistic approach to the force development, how 
SOCOM develops leaders is just as important as who. 
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B. LEADERSHIP TO PROMOTION, OR PROMOTING LEADERSHIP 
The development of future officers and leaders is potentially the most important 
element to restoring the cultural ethic of SOCOM. Paradoxically, the evolution of 
developing former and current leaders has also been one of the largest contributors to the 
erosion of the culture. The challenge, like others when addressing cultural issues within 
SOCOM, is complex and in part a by-product of two decades of war. Traditional values 
such as professional military education (PME) or career broadening outside combat roles 
has been neglected and at time discouraged, which only exacerbates a combat culture. The 
biggest hurdle SOCOM must contend with in developing future leaders is defeating its own 
self-fulfilling prophecy, a war only focus creates only war focused leaders.  
Commanders at all levels are at the forefront of developing and maintaining an 
effective culture that upholds the professional military values. Military professionals have 
a far more complex problem set that distinguishes them from other professions within 
society, violence is their craft.154 The management of violence requires a high level of 
expertise, as Huntington points out “it is not a skill which can be mastered simply by 
learning existing techniques, it is in a continuous process of development, and it is 
necessary for the officer to be aware of his development and be aware of its main tendencies 
and trends.”155  
Officers have two obligations they must fulfill. First, officers are responsible for 
the ethical conduct of war and ensuring their subordinates are held accountable to the 
same.156 Failure to properly develop leaders to discharge these duties on behalf of the 
society will threaten the public trust of those they are charged to serve. The second 
obligation is to their subordinates. Officers are entrusted with the care of those they lead, 
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ensuring the basic needs of their subordinates are met to include physical well-being, 
mental health, and moral development.157 The challenge many officers face is how to 
balance these two obligations. The report accessed “SOCOM’s cultural focus on SOF 
employment and mission accomplishment is to the detriment of leadership, discipline, and 
accountability.”158 At multiple levels, leadership within SOCOM has been compromised 
by two generations of war.  
The demands of war have caused a myopic leadership culture within SOCOM, there 
are those that are in and essentially those that are forced out. Officers that accepted career 
opportunities away from the battlefield are removed and placed in the out-group. The in-
group, or combat proven leaders, gain influence within the organization and naturally pick 
those most like them to mentor. Over time, those that rebuffed the combat culture are forced 
out and only those with cooperating behavior remain. In effect, creating an evolutionary 
cycle of convergent thought processes, or similar mindsets that rarely disagree with 
acceptable solutions or outcomes. Convergent thought stifles the innovation from external 
ideas and only allows the in-group identity to become stronger.159 An organization that 
embraces innovation slowly succumbs to an insular thought paradigm. The bureaucratic 
process naturally takes over and you begin to see a cycle of similar leadership models.  
Selective retention of combat-minded folk lead to retention and bias towards more 
like-minded junior officers. Senior officers develop an unconscious bias towards combat 
leaders based on their own life experience.160 Senior leaders pick and promote junior 
officers that share similar markers to their own careers, in affect creating a prestige bias 
within the organization.161 This idea is part of human psychology. People are drawn to 
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others that they believe share similar traits.162 In a sense, we see a reflection of ourselves 
and by promoting that we are therefore justifying and promoting our own values throughout 
the organization.163 Edgar Schein suggests the promotion of similar mindsets within an 
organization is normal, but warns it leads to special treatment rules forming within the 
organization. Schein suggested “insiders (combat proven leaders as it applies to SOCOM) 
get special benefits, are trusted more, get higher basic rewards, and most important get a 
sense of identity for belonging to a defined organization. Outsiders get labeled and treated 
with indifference and hostility.”164 The SOCOM CR cited multiple instances where SOF 
leaders valued and promoted combat experience above all else, “from accession pipelines 
to their first SOF units, SOF personnel are encouraged to emulate those who have tactical 
deployment experience,” “in return, those who did deploy forward, specifically in some 
degree of combat, are held as almost an infallible standard bearer for the rest of the 
organization to emulate, seemingly regardless if it is a positive or negative standard.”165 
The institutional bias towards combat experience is evident within SOCOM. The challenge 
for SOCOM, however, will be balance. SOF should have a bias towards combat, but not to 
the detriment of its future human capital. 
Simply placing someone in a position of authority or telling them they are a leader 
does not constitute leadership. Developing leaders to understand how their use of influence 
and power can create or change an organization is crucial to fostering a healthy 
organizational climate. A 1959 research project conducted by social psychologist Bertram 
Raven and John French set to distinguish how leaders use of power could influence 
subordinate’s behavior within the group. French and Raven’s results suggest leaders use of 
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expert (task-relevant knowledge), referent (admiration and attraction to the leader), or 
reward (rewarding obedience) positively impacted followers ethical behavior when the 
followers perceived these leaders to be more ethical.”166 The study demonstrates that the 
ethical actions of leaders play a large role not only in the effectiveness of the organization, 
but the ethical conduct of subordinates as well.167 Perceived ethical conduct of leaders is 
established through their actions to both superiors and subordinates. Their actions and 
perceived motivations for action are as important as their form of power utilized to gain 
obedience of followers. 
Openness, transparency, and honesty are among the key attributes of effective 
leaders. To be effective, a leader must not only analyze the subordinates within his 
authority but his own behavior openly and honestly. Establishing a higher level of 
emotional intelligence (EQ) has shown to positively impact leadership effectiveness and 
job performance.168 Higher levels of EQ among leaders not only increased effectiveness, 
it improved followers’ perceptions of their leaders ethical behavior.169 Applied to the 
French and Raven study, increasing perceived ethical conduct of leaders will have a 
positive impact on ethical conduct of followers, thus training leaders to better understand 
their own EQ will positively impact the ethical conduct of the organization. Leaders with 
higher levels of EQ also exhibit more openness and transparency when dealing with 
problems.170 Leaders more likely to be open and transparent of internal issues could reduce 
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disciplinary problems within their organization some social experts believe.171 
Transparency when dealing with issues can build the trust of followers in their leaders’ 
decisions and establish a healthy culture of self-regulation and accountability.172  
A close-minded approach to issues reduces internal trust and promotes a culture of 
apathy to specific problems. Open recognition of today’s challenges has the potential to 
empower future leaders and embrace divergent thought to collectively provide solutions in 
a growing complex environment. Future SOCOM leaders should be capable of conducting 
critical decisions in dynamic environments, cautious of over valuing competing priorities, 
and humble in their use of authority. Twenty years of unconventional war has altered our 
traditional command and control (C2) structures. Critical decisions with strategic impacts 
have been forced down too much lower levels; younger officers and NCO’s now shoulder 
more of the responsibility to ensure our national policy objectives are executed within the 
bounds of acceptable ethical conduct.173 Commanders and senior non-commissioned 
officers should focus more on institutional issues. Their ability to relate to military values 
over specialized experience should function as the foundation of the professional military 
ethic to their subordinates.174 Modern warfare requires more of officers and leaders than 
just being managers of violence, as the landscape of future conflict appears to be a much 
broader concept of innovation through competition.175 Future operating environments 
require officers that encompasses analytical skill in a myriad of situations, capable of 
mentoring and building subordinates below them. Such efforts to address officer 
development are currently underway in the Army. 
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The Army has taken a step forward in their promotion of leaders with the Army 
capstone concept which empowers operational adaptability. The concept has changed the 
way in which battalion commanders are selected and promoted, adding subordinate 
statements as qualifiers for potential promotion.176 The concept still draws on written 
performance reviews, but now leaders must contend with how well their leadership was 
perceived at lower levels. The idea of accepting subordinate comments not only adds a 
layer of accountability for the officer candidate but demonstrates the Army’s value of 
subordinate input. AFSOC has progressed as well in their talent management of senior 
officers, offering their best talent up to other major commands within the Air Force. 
AFSOC command leaders believe it provides opportunity to broaden their top officers and 
subsequently place remaining officers in leadership positions that otherwise would not 
have been granted leadership opportunities.177 AFSOC’s initiative reinforces the 
importance of developing future officers for a broader context within the military, 
Although many of these high-powered officers (HPO) have been raised in the combat 
culture the best way to balance their desires and cultural bias is to expose them to the other 
institutional operating environments. The changes within specific SOCOM communities 
should be viewed as necessary change based on past assessment. Although changes in 
officer development have begun, the future of human capital will be short sighted without 
a thorough emphasis on a key element of development—education. 
C. TRAINING AND EDUCATION: DEVELOPING HUMAN CAPITAL 
THROUGH COMBAT 
The human capital within SOCOM is what provides the competitive advantage over 
our nation’s adversaries.178 How that human capital is developed can be the difference 
between winning and losing; in essence it is what makes SOCOM special. Developing 
special operators starts with education and training. For many, it is the first glimpse into an 
elite organization they have longed to be a part of. Initial training should be the cornerstone 
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of SOF development establishing the value of high standards and professional conduct. Yet 
for many, this may be the origins of a SOF culture that is overly focused on combat.  
Many SOF units disproportionately value force employment over force generation 
(FORGEN).179 The FORGEN process is the training environment that prepares operators 
for combat and broadens career opportunities. It is the initial pipeline training, the tactical 
skills training, and developmental education that broadens and develops the human capital 
of the force. Yet, in large part SOCOM has undervalued the FORGEN process. Critical 
instructor manning for FORGEN institutions has been stripped in order to fill additional 
deployment billets. The lack of highly experienced or even highly distributed training staff 
establishes an organizational assumption to initial trainees; employment is more important 
that development. Comparing the process to that of AFSOC’s talent management of 
officers, in which commanders believe allowing top talent to grow from abroad creating 
positions for other officers to step in to, the same logic could be applied to talent within the 
FORGEN process. A resolute process that stipulates training instructors would not be 
removed would not only reinforce the importance of training but would enable SOF 
operators to gain experience and responsibility on the battlefield. Restoring discipline to 
the FORGEN process not only emphasizes its value, but it reinforces a culture that values 
human development from the start of SOF operator’s career. 
Combat culture not only interrupted the FORGEN process, but it also influenced 
the training priorities and contributed to a force shortsighted on CT. The CR found most 
all training environments focused solely on CT and direct action (DA) as core activities.180 
Arguably, this is largely attributable to the culture of what SOF knows and driven by 
current combat requirements. Regardless, the singular focus has impacted the ability for 
purposefully assigned teams to conduct traditional missions. The identity crisis within SF, 
as Col Croot suggests over 50% of SF currently identifies with a DA culture, can trace its 
roots back to the initial FORGEN cycle.181 Evidence from the CR may support Col. 
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Croot’s claim, citing “while conducting FID missions to Build Partner Capacity (BPC) in 
support of GCC Commanders, the force exhibits-at time-high risk behavior which has 
contributed to some of the recent incidents of misconduct and unethical behavior.”182 A 
SOF unit that cannot conduct one of its core tasks should be a stark warning to leaders 
within SOCOM of the issues within their FORGEN process. The issues within SF should 
also be an indicator of how much influence the FORGEN cycle can have on the force as a 
potential creator of alternate identities within a SOF unit. The potential for this influence 
to change a community should impede their willingness to continually interrupt it. The 
restoration of SOF core activities outside COIN and CT operations should be a priority for 
SOCOM commanders. Realigning a cultural focus on combat after twenty years of war 
will require a transformation of the force. The key to transformation may lie in reviving 
the emphasis on education. 
Professional development of SOF is the key to producing intellectual capital within 
the force. Morris Janowitz, American political scientist, argues “career development of 
officers education thus plays a more critical role than specific training.”183 Although still 
true today, this statement now must include NCO’s as they have become key decision 
makers on the battlefield. Regardless, the development of human capital relies on the 
education instilled in them. Arguably, no other profession promotes the importance of 
education more than the U.S. Military. Every officer must obtain a bachelor’s degree at a 
minimum, and a master’s degree is highly desired for field grade officers and required for 
colonel.184 Each service has their own dedicated universities. PME is required at 
intermediate levels as individuals progress in rank. SOCOM has their own research and 
education arm in Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) that ties into most service 
universities. On the surface, it is hard to imagine a profession that places more emphasis 
 
182 USSOCOM, United States Special Operation Command Comprehensive Review, 39. 
183 Janowitz, The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization, 51. 
184 James Joyner, “Soldier-Scholar (Pick One): Anti-Intellectualism in the American Military,” War 
on the Rocks, August 25, 2020, http://warontherocks.com/2020/08/soldier-scholar-pick-one-anti-
intellectualism-in-the-american-military/. 
48 
on education. Below the surface, we see a culture that views education more akin to 
checking a box, and a distraction from real military employment.185  
The CR found in most cases “SOF personnel who had not yet attended PME did 
not perceive it as being worthwhile.”186 Time away from the tactical environment was a 
dissuading narrative as SOF personnel already spend more time on average in training 
pipelines. Most individuals recognize school only as an indicator for promotion, not an 
opportunity to broaden their intellectual capacity.187 Among the officer ranks, this 
indicator is strongest if you are selected for in-residence intermediate developmental 
education (IDE) or senior developmental education (SDE). All other non-selected officers 
are encouraged to complete schooling in correspondence (online). The motivation to spend 
your nights online, when you already operate in a high ops tempo environment, is low. The 
motivation is lower when individuals associate the online version with not getting 
promoted or not on track for command. Senior leaders have even hinted that it is just a box 
to check—an exercise of clicking through the slides to just get it done is acceptable.188 
Even those selected for in-residence education are highly decorated combat veterans, 
simply capping off the education requirement as a promotion requirement. The sentiment 
has led many to question the intentions of educational requirements. Do they exist to create 
a more strategic focused force, or are they merely another block to be used a discriminator 
for promotion?  
Education should be an institutional value and more than just a written requirement. 
Asking members to spend additional time checking a box will not instill the cultural value 
of education among their subordinates. In the 2018 National Defense Strategy, Secretary 
of Defense Jim Mattis stated, “professional military education has stagnated, focused more 
on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity.”189 
As the future of conflict evolves, SOCOM will require strategically minded scholars with 
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not only the combat capacity but intellectual capacity to outthink their adversaries.190 
Formal PME courses cannot be just an extension of CT tactics and thought. They should 
provide a deeper understanding of any operating environment, provide the tools for future 
leaders to be innovative thinkers and decision makers. The development of intellectual 
capital at all levels plays an important role in not only producing strategic thinkers for 
future war applications but can have a direct impact on the ethical conduct of the force.  
Education is not limited to PME courses and earning college credits. The decisions 
operators make every day are a direct reflection of their unit driven education and training. 
Much of the education SOF personnel get is informal or directed at the local level. Hours 
of computer-based training (CBT) modules are required along with face-to-face training 
requirements. Arguably, the restoration of the ethical foundation should start at the 
individual level. Huntington stressed professionals “must self-develop, be accountable, and 
self-regulate,” all “expectations start at the individual level.”191 Although leaders’ actions 
and decisions play a role in establishing the ethical culture of the group, the individual is 
inevitably responsible. The role of ethics training and education at the lowest levels could 
provide the additional awareness within the organization to establishing a healthy ethical 
culture. A focus on ethical conduct would not only develop individual character but 
strengthen organizational cohesion and build character amongst small groups.192 Ethical 
training should not only serve to better prepare SOF operators for combat but could provide 
additional layers of analysis for leadership roles and opportunities as individuals progress 
through the ranks.  
There are multiple benefits to organizational ethics training, however, the most 
important could be the additional awareness and education to better understand situational 
factors that could potentially lead to unethical behavior. As evidence suggests, unethical 
behavior can be a result of internal values or be a reaction to social environments. An 
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individual may internally believe something is immoral but feel justified to participate if 
the social group presents the behavior as acceptable. Cultures can heavily influence moral 
and ethical behavior of individuals. A combat culture with repeated exposure to violence 
and high stress can produce a ripe environment for unethical conduct, which is arguably 
the exact environment many SOF operators live in.  
D. THE COST OF A HIGH STRESS ENVIRONMENT 
The operating environment in which SOF conducts its missions is undoubtedly 
highly stressful. High stress environments have been shown to increase the potential for 
unethical misconduct, negatively affect individual’s mental health, and reduce moral 
reasoning.193 Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSD) expert Jonathan Shay suggests 
“persistent mobilization for danger and twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week vigilance 
in the form of mental and physical preparation for attack is a form of duress that can impact 
moral choice.”194 Knowing that SOF deployments have quadrupled in the past twenty years 
would also provide some insights of the extent operators are placed in a high-stress 
environment.195 Acknowledging SOF operators have lived in a high stress environment for 
the past two decades also suggests the stress operators have endured has played a potential 
role in the mental health of the force. Notably, mental health was not mentioned once within 
the SOCOM CR.196 The absence of such data could possibly lead to more questions than 
answers, as the 2011 POTFF study mentioned mental health as a specific area of concern for 
SOF operators. 
The 2011 Pressure on the Force and Family (POTFF) report was initiated following 
a string of criminal and unethical behavior amongst SOF individuals. The report stated, “after 
ten years of continuous combat operations and an ever-increasing demand for SOF, we are 
witnessing significant physical, mental, and emotional strains on our Force and Families. 
This is not simply about multiple combat deployments. It is an accumulation of effects 
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throughout the deployment cycle that compound and already uncertain and unpredictable 
SOF lifestyle.”197 The 2011 POTFF report echoes many of the factors discussed in this 
thesis, indicating a combat culture has placed heavy cost among SOF members and their 
families. These issues have plagued the force in a myriad of ways, all at the detriment of 
organizational effectiveness and personal well-being. 
War has become a way of life for SOF operators. The psychological wounds of war 
have manifested in their daily lives. The heavy ops tempo on SOF has caused relationship 
problems, depression, mental health issues, and substance abuse issues. Research from 2012 
suggested 20% of SOF suffer from PTSD, more than double their conventional 
counterparts.198 The American Association of Suicidology (AAS) in 2016 revealed suicides 
within SOF were the highest among the military, 30% higher than conventional rates, and 
higher than the general population.199 In a span of eight years, 2007–2015, there were 117 
SOF suicides.200 AAS conducted psychological autopsies on 29 of the individuals and found 
nearly half were alcohol dependent, and 28 out of 29 had known issues such as relationship 
issues, financial issues, or legal issues.201 Jonathan Schroden, Director for Center of Naval 
Analysis Research, along with his counterpart Marqaux Hoar studied “the effect high 
operational tempo had on a number of units” within SOF and found “problematic 
behaviors—driving under the influence or using illegal drugs—correlated positively with 
time.”202 The cumulative affects seemingly extend through all facets of many SOF operators 
lives. 
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Spouses and family members also sacrifice for the high ops tempo of SOF. Research 
indicates “associations between deployment frequency and duration, and decreased military 
spouse well-being (e.g., depression and anxiety), increased child problematic behaviors, and 
negative effects on parent child and member-spouse relationships.”203 A 2013 Rand report 
indicated cumulative months of deployment positively associated with risk of divorce, and 
that 97% of divorces occurred after deployment.204 The research supports the findings from 
the 2011 POTFF study, citing “a clear trend that married couple feel distanced in their 
relationships and the sense of “growing apart” is a major factor in the failure of marriages.205 
While divorce is a societal reality, service members and families commented that “proxy or 
failed marriages are becoming more pervasive in the force.”206 The unpredictability and 
constant tempo of SOF creates a challenging environment for spouses to plan around. 
Marriages suffer from the inability to even talk about your day. Due to the secret nature of 
their profession, SOF operators cannot have casual conversations with their spouse or 
children about the general nature of their work.207 Leaving your family for extended periods 
of time, missing birthdays, anniversaries, children’s birth, or the feeling you are raising your 
kids through a computer screen can all negatively affect individual’s mental health and 
subsequently have negative effects on moral reasoning.  
SOF forces are not just affected by mental stressor at home, they are exposed to them 
continually in combat. SOF has focused on CT and DA throughout much of GWOT, both of 
which bring small teams closer to their enemy in close quarters combat. The proximity to 
their combatants lends to increased exposure of repeated violent interactions among SOF. 
Repeated exposure to violence has been proven to negatively affect individual’s mental 
health over time. Studies suggest “exposure to human violence can motivate less ethical 
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decision making.”208 Military psychologist Peter Kilner believes “we have become so 
effective in training soldiers how to kill that soldiers often do not consider the moral 
repercussions of their actions.”209  
SOF weapons and tactics also present unique risks not experienced by conventional 
forces. A Special Operations Association of America study found SOF operators are at an 
elevated risk of developing chronic-neuro inflammation (CNI); trauma that results in 
“alterations of the molecular chemistry of the brain.”210 More research is required to fully 
understand the extent and effects of CNI on human moral behavior and judgment. However, 
much like the brain disease chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) which has gained public 
attention for its effects on National Football League players, any trauma that disrupts proper 
brain function can lead to irrational and unethical behavior that would normally be 
considered uncharacteristic of the individual.211 Combat scars come in many more forms; 
mental trauma of witnessing friends die, dismembered, or badly wounded, physical trauma, 
frustration of operations, living with bad decisions all of which are only exacerbated when 
personal issues arise at home. There is no way around the combat stress many SOF operators 
face, building resilient forces to withstand the fatigue is one of few options. 
SOCOM has not turned a blind eye to the ethical issues or combat stress. Following 
the 2011 POTFF study, an official POTFF (Preservation) program was established within 
SOCOM. Congressionally funded, POTFF is the only program of its kind within the DOD. 
POTFF consists of five domains to address and support service members and their families.  
• Psychological performance- improve cognitive and behavioral performance. 
Help SM and families to cope with stress, improve readiness. 
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• Human performance- holistic physical treatment and training. Includes 
sports medicine, strength and conditioning, performance nutrition, and 
sports psychology. 
• Social and family performance- family resiliency programs. 
• Spiritual performance- enhance core spiritual beliefs, values, awareness, 
relationships, and experiences.212 
POTFF was developed to combat the issues within the force recognized by the 2011 
POTFF review. Although the intention is to meet the needs of service members and their 
families, further analysis of the program revealed there is plenty of work to still be done 
within the organization to function properly. In a twelve-week study, there is little evidence 
to support that the program is effective at conducting any of the five domain priorities.213 
More research is required in multiple areas to fully understand the mental trauma present 
within SOCOM. 
Currently, there is no inclusive research to indicate what the cumulative effects from 
twenty years of war has had on SOF’s mental health. There are numerous studies on the 
military in general, but these do not recognize SOF’s unique roles and employment methods. 
General data is not sufficient to fully grasp the extent of mental health issues within SOF. 
More research is required to fully understand the extent of which SOF operators suffer from 
PTSD or CNI. Additional research regarding family and marriage issues within SOCOM 
specifically are needed to address the external stressors present among SOF. Abundant 
anecdotal evidence exists yet lack the in-depth research to truly understand the extent of the 
issue within SOF. Helping the force becomes harder when you do not know where to start.  
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V. SOCIAL WAR 
A. EXCEPTIONAL AMERICA 
The United States has been a global influence for well over a hundred years. 
Following WWII, American exceptionalism found its stride. Nations were tattered and 
destroyed; the U.S. was left standing amongst the rubble. A vacuum for power had been 
created and the United States filled it. Since then, the idea of American exceptionalism has 
driven the global world order.214 Exceptionalism has contributed to U.S. global 
prominence. American strength and power have influenced world economic standing, 
fostered cooperation among international partners and allies, significantly shaped 
international law, and toppled regimes.  
Being situated atop the global food chain has created a seemingly untouchable 
nation. Although, retaining power comes at a cost. Over time, America has also become 
the global police and caregiver. Prominence and cooperative power are maintained through 
fear and deterrence. Thus, came the idea of American militarism, the need for a powerful 
and lethal force to deter and coerce foreign policy abroad. In 1903, President Theodore 
Roosevelt summed up the idea of American militarism when he famously said, “speak 
softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.”215 The adage is simple: foreign policy is more 
effective when a powerful military exists to enforce it.  
Americans embrace the ideals of being a dominant global superpower and utilizing 
the military to retain it. Arguably, it is this ideology that has manifested in the longevity of 
a free and prosperous nation. American society not only approves of military action on 
behalf of U.S. power, it expects it. Throughout history, society has rewarded presidents 
with the courage to take the fight to any adversary willing to challenge U.S. resolve. 
President Roosevelt’s approval rating increased by 18% following the U.S. response to 
Pearl Harbor attacks; the same increase President Bush enjoyed by his handling of the Gulf 
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War.216 These polls, however; indicate another unique facet of American views on war—
they never consider losing. The largest jump in approval during Vietnam was not going 
into combat but instead pulling out.217 Americans embrace of war only lasted so long as a 
win was guaranteed.  
Vietnam tested American resolve and exposed a nation built around militaristic 
ideals. After fourteen years of sustained U.S. involvement, the promise of success was 
gone. American troops were withdrawn. Unsuccessful, American exceptionalism was left 
to question; how could Vietnamese insurgents fend off the U.S. military? Answer: 
American political leaders underestimated the will of the Viet Cong (VC) to resist.218 The 
belief in military superiority led the U.S. to committing one of its biggest mistakes in 
history, underestimating its opponent. The military was left tattered and defeated. Marine 
Colonel Robert Heinl Jr. stated U.S. forces were “clobbered and buffeted from without and 
within by social turbulence, pandemic drug addiction, race war, sedition, civilian 
scapegoatise, draft recalcitrance and malevolence, barracks theft and common crime” and 
left without congressional support.219 Vietnam was a public failure that plagued American 
society. Restoring American exceptionalism was now the priority. 
Rebranding and rebuilding the armed forces were the first steps to regaining 
American superiority. A massive shift in focus and strategy empowered the change for the 
military to reinvent itself. Renewed vision towards operational excellence drove innovation 
to new levels and fueled the generation of new weaponry, doctrine, and tactics.220 The 
failure of Vietnam exposed the vulnerability to American power, however; renewed 
American militarism was the answer to ensure it never happened again.  
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B. SOCIETY’S EMBRACE OF WAR
SOCOM has become the epitome of American exceptionalism. SOF operators
represent the hero in every story, the knight willing to sacrifice for the good of others. Of 
course, SOF operators should be highly valued as they provide a capability for the 
American public that is unmatched. However, their mere existence and prominence create 
a falsehood for the American public; that any adversary willing to challenge American 
power would be relegated swiftly. 
Reliance on military strength presents a challenge for American diplomacy in 
conflict. Endless war has become part of our society while many choose to ignore the 
costs.221 As long as the U.S. is winning Americans are fine with that. American success 
through warfare has created the very antithetical environment that leads to its pursuit of 
conflict-ends through military means is the simple answer to U.S. foreign issues.222 
America’s soft power agencies, those that deal directly with foreign diplomatic policy, 
have been gutted, their roles being picked up by the DOD as their budgets soar.223 In 2014, 
the DOD budget reached $500 billion while the state department budget was a mere $47 
billion.224 If time and money are indicators for what an organization values (which they 
are), the disparity in budgets may suggest the value Americans place on war. American 
militarism begins to be that of a self-licking ice cream cone; the more they are asked to 
solve issues, the more budgets swing in their favor, which only leads to expecting the 
military to do more.225 Rosa Brooks refers to the sentiment perfectly stating, “if your only 
tool is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.”226 In some ways, however, the military 
might be the only institutions trusted enough to handle America’s biggest problems.  
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As the military engages in more issues their public approval increases while 
politician’s approval goes down. A 2019 Pew Research poll showed 89% of Americans 
took pride in the U.S. Military.227 Conversely, only 32% of Americans had any pride in 
our political system, a number that had been steadily declining.228 Thus, perpetuating the 
idea of military involvement; Americans do not trust politicians to diplomatically deal with 
issues, they would rather support the idea of the military forcing a solution.229 The 
common solution sought in the last twenty years has been SOF.230  
When the twin towers fell on September 11, 2001 Americans resoundingly 
supported the idea of war. Over 92% of Americans were satisfied with the war and its 
progress in late 2001.231 American’s were confident the U.S. would defeat the terrorist 
responsible. Many were confident in the military forces, mainly SOF, to track down Osama 
Bin Laden. There was no reason to believe otherwise. Year after year, however, the war 
has continued with little to show for it and support has been waning. Recent polls suggest 
over 40% of Americans believe the war in Afghanistan was a mistake, over 60% believe it 
is no longer worth fighting.232 One reason Americans may be second guessing their 
acceptance of war, however, is due to their inability to understand what kind of war the 
GWOT would be. 
C. THE ETHICS OF IRREGULAR WAR 
Evidence suggests there are reasons to doubt the claim that the GWOT is a new 
kind of war. Rather, it is in many ways like the war the U.S. lost in Vietnam with new 
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tactics. In both instances, the U.S. was engaged in asymmetric warfare, a form of irregular 
warfare. Irregular warfare is defined by U.S. military doctrine as a “form of warfare 
characterized as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 
influence over the relevant population(s).”233 Asymmetric warfare implies a disparity in 
either capability or volume of force. SOCOM is uniquely tailored to engage in 
unconventional warfare, as outlined in Title 10 of the U.S. code.234 The American 
militaries’ capabilities and sheer size are vastly disproportionate to their past foes, but 
irregular warfare presents peculiar challenges.  
Waging war against non-state actors or violent extremist groups complicate the 
rules of war. There is no state entity of which to negotiate or coerce through diplomatic 
international sanctions.235 The U.S. is left fighting an insurgent force, one in which plays 
by their own rules. Uniformed soldiers are replaced with guerrilla fighters indistinguishable 
from the local populace. The battlefield disperses and becomes undefined, combatants are 
harder to identify.236 Vietnam insurgents had the jungles to disappear into, and Al Qaeda 
hid throughout the Afghan mountains. This dynamic of war can become increasingly 
frustrating for SOF operators because you cannot hit what you cannot see. Information 
becomes the advantage, one in which the smaller less distinguishable force holds. The 
warzone is arguably more convoluted and complex than conventional war. The complexity 
and irregularities become a ripe environment for misconduct. 
Historically, irregular warfare has accounted for far more instances of barbarism, 
ethical misconduct, and morally reprehensible conduct than conventional warfare.237 The 
war is essentially fought to achieve influence over the civilian population. A clear strategy 
is critical to understanding local populace needs and motivations. Insurgents manipulate 
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the battlefield, targeting civilian populations or weak military targets attempting to invoke 
an emotional response.238 Lawful combatants become harder to distinguish. Is it a civilian 
or an insurgent - a sympathizer or criminal? SOF operators are expected to make split 
second decisions in a high stress environments. Choose wrong and you could be killed by 
a child wearing a suicide vest or accidentally kill a civilian. Every decision seemingly 
becomes an impossible ethical dilemma. The very people SOF are fighting to win support 
over potentially become the people paying the highest price, and it is hard to win that way. 
Irregular warfare requires a great amount of restraint and emotional control by SOF, two 
things that become increasingly harder to do in the operational space. As prolonged fear, 
stress, and anger mount moral decision making is impacted. However, surrendering 
position on the moral high ground will do the adversaries work for them.239 Recognizing 
the moral dimension of war grows more difficult as the boundaries of the battlefield 
continue to blur for SOF. These boundaries, however, are socially constructed, and at times 
it seems American society approves if it can be justified. 
D. JUSTIFYING ATROCITY 
War changes everything. The need to ensure American dominance can drive society 
to accept that acts that are considered immoral or illegal in peacetime are permissible, even 
praiseworthy in wartime.240 This does not mean all American society approves of 
unethical behavior, but it does mean a portion will always find a way to justify the means. 
Just as history is littered with cases of ethical misconduct in war, there are many examples 
of politicians and even the American public offering justification. This is yet another 
instance where Vietnam and the GWOT intersect. 
The My Lai Massacre is remembered as one of the worst war crimes in American 
history. On March 16, 1968 more than 500 Vietnamese civilians were murdered by 
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American soldiers of Charlie Company in the village of My Lai.241 On a “search and 
destroy” mission, the soldiers were sent to kill the VC believed to be there.242  
The American troops did not find any VC in My Lai, but they did find roughly 500 
villagers who unknowingly were awaiting their slaughter. The civilians were rounded up, 
beaten, tortured, and murdered at gunpoint and by hand grenades. Hamlets were burned, to 
some accounts with people still inside.243 Nearly all civilians were slaughtered that day. 
The only reason the killing stopped was due to American helicopter pilot Major Hugh 
Thompson. Upon noticing the unusual activity, Thompson and his crew recognized the 
slaughter that was taking place. Thompson landed his helicopter in between Charlie 
Company and the villagers, ordering their American counterparts to cease fire or they 
would be fired upon by the helicopter’s gunners.244 Charlie Company suffered one 
casualty on that day; a member that had shot himself in the foot to avoid participating.245 
Although the acts were atrocious, the response from military and government leaders was 
equally disappointing. 
The atrocity at My Lai was reported to military and congressional leaders, only to 
be ignored. Major Thompson and his crew were shunned by the military, cast out as traitors 
to their own.246 Other witnesses came forward as well, but to no avail. The media initially 
reported the events at My Lai as a success, suggesting multiple VC had been killed in the 
mission. It was all a lie. Journalist, Seymore Hersh, subsequently published an article 
describing the massacre at My Lai. Leaders could no longer ignore the truth.247 Instead of 
 
241 Charles M Rowling, Penelope Sheets, and Timothy M Jones, “American Atrocity Revisited: 
National Identity, Cascading Frames, and the My Lai Massacre,” Political Communication 32 (2015): 1–
21, https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2014.944323. 
242 Rowling, Sheets, and Jones, 310. 
243 Seek History, My Lai Massacre - The Most Shocking Episode of the Vietnam War, video (Seek 
History, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tLuBtv1EtcI. 
244 Seek History. 
245 Rowling, Sheets, and Jones, “American Atrocity Revisited: National Identity, Cascading Frames, 
and the My Lai Massacre.” 
246 Seek History, My Lai Massacre - The Most Shocking Episode of the Vietnam War. 
247 Rowling, Sheets, and Jones, “American Atrocity Revisited: National Identity, Cascading Frames, 
and the My Lai Massacre.” 
62 
investigating the matter, political leaders decided to create a task force to “control the 
problem,” the problem being Hersh.248 However, My Lai became a symbol of anti-war 
protest and the public demanded answers. 
Upon investigation, 26 members would be charged with murder in My Lai, 
however only one was convicted. Lieutenant William Calley was sentenced to life in prison 
for his role in the killings. The Charlie Company Commander was acquitted, even though 
reports suggested he participated in the killings. No other military officers in the chain of 
command or elected leaders were held accountable for their roles in the cover up. In fact, 
Lt Calley would spend less than three days in a military prison before being released and 
placed on house arrest. A public outcry of support would subsequently lead President 
Nixon to release him completely.249 How could this be? Why would the public support 
such an atrocity? 
The American public wants to believe in its heroes. Events like My Lai lead society 
to find a way to rationalize the unethical actions as a means to believe in their nation’s 
ideals. Instead of recognizing the events for what they are, acts that go against all American 
values and ideals, people justify the atrocity as a cost of war. The cost to maintain American 
exceptionalism. The handling of the My Lai Massacre is eerily similar to recent charges of 
war crimes among the Navy SEALs. 
Allegations of war crimes at the hands of SEAL Team Seven began to surface in 
2017. Members of SEAL Team Seven reported Chief Petty Officer Eddie Gallagher had 
killed innocent civilians while on sniper watch along with killing a wounded detainee, then 
taking pictures with the corpse. Witnesses stated Chief Gallagher, a trained sniper, shot an 
elderly man and a young girl while on sniper watch, both clearly civilians.250 Gallagher 
was also reported to have stabbed a wounded teen-aged enemy detainee multiple times in 
the neck as he was receiving medical attention, inevitably killing him.251 Gallagher then 
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took a picture with the corpse, sending it to a friend with a text message that read “good 
story behind this, got him with my hunting knife.”252 The incidents with Gallagher were 
not isolated, however. Multiple members stated Gallagher would indiscriminately fire 
rockets at houses and recklessly fire his machine gun towards villages.253 In 2010, 
Gallagher was reported by Army SF soldiers for shooting a young girl to kill a combatant 
behind her.254 A 2014 reports shows he attempted to run over a Naval police officer.255 
Other members of his unit stated Gallagher “bragged about slaying 10–20 people a day or 
150–200 a deployment.”256 When members within the unit came forward and reported 
their Chief, they were all warned against it. The SEALs were warned they could possibly 
lose their trident if they continued to press the issue. The accusers were labeled as traitors 
and harassed by the other SEALs. Initial reports mounted to no internal or external 
investigations. In fact, promotion evaluations show his superiors thought he was the perfect 
guy to lead the platoon, a combat proven vet.257 Eventually, members within the unit 
threatened to go public if an investigation was not launched. 
The investigation into the allegations of war crimes culminated with Chief 
Gallagher being charged with first degree murder. Although, the narrative started to 
change. Navy officials and lawyers all stated the other SEALs were disgruntled, that they 
did not like Gallagher and did not think he deserved to be in a leadership position. His own 
lawyer stated the other members were upset that Gallagher would steal their food or put 
them in reckless situations,258 Witnesses began to step back, many of them refusing to 
testify and one even changing his story to admit he was the one that killed the captive.259 
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Chief Gallagher was acquitted and only convicted of the lesser charge, posing with a 
corpse.260 No other officers in the chain of command were held accountable, including his 
direct supervisor which is believed to have led the cover up. Much like the My Lai 
Massacre, public outcry resulted in President Trump pardoning Gallagher and allowing 
him to retire with his trident; a move that went against Naval Special Warfare Commander 
Rear Admiral Collin Green.261 Since his pardon, Gallagher has openly stated the 
combatant was killed by his team and that everyone was in on it. On a recent Apple podcast 
Gallagher revealed “we killed that guy. Our intention was to kill him, everybody was on 
board. It was to do medical scenarios on him until he died.”262 The events led to further 
scrutiny of the prestigious SEAL community. Comparing the accounts of My Lai with that 
of Chief Gallagher suggest we did not learn from our history. 
Accountability for war crimes, or in this case lack of accountability, can be just as 
damning as the events themselves. Both My Lai and Chief Gallagher share many 
similarities that would lead some to question if military leaders, government officials, or 
even the public really want to deter war crimes. Both instances were heinous, yet no one 
suffered any consequences, why is that? Neither case was immediately investigated. It 
seems that threats of public scrutiny were the driving factors that led to any investigation 
at all. This must lead some to believe military leaders and government officials do not 
really care about the act, they care more about the reputation. In both cases, the ethical 
action of those willing to stop the misconduct were questioned and ridiculed more than the 
unethical actors themselves. Maj Hughs and members of SEAL Team Seven were cast out 
as traitors and warned they would be punished if they persisted to seek accountability. 
These actions certainly do not foster an environment that promotes accountability. How 
does this support the ethical foundation of an organization? Why is the public so quick to 
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cry out for the war criminal and demand protection, why should they get a pass? What 
message is sent went presidents cede the moral high ground and exonerate these criminals? 
These are all questions we should be asking. 
Society can have special operators and ethical conduct of war; but they must 
demand it. The SOCOM CR stated they found a culture that promoted combat to the 
detriment of leadership and accountability.263 The Eddie Gallagher incident should be 
proof of what can happen within this type of culture. Chief Gallagher was promoted on his 
combat prowess, inept to effectively lead his men and committed criminal acts. He got a 
pass. Around the same time of the CR release, the Gallagher case took another interesting 
turn. NSW Commander Rear Admiral Collin Green set out to reinforce a culture of 
accountability and restore good order and discipline to the NSW community. Rear Adm. 
Green ordered a review board of all officers that had supervised Gallagher throughout his 
deployment.264 The reviews were subsequently halted by civilian leaders. Acting Navy 
Secretary Thomas Modly stated, “given the unique circumstances of these three remaining 
cases, I have determined that any failures in conduct, performance, judgment, or 
professionalism exhibited by these officers be addressed through other administrative 
measures as appropriate, such as letters of instruction or performance observations on their 
officer fitness reports.”265 The intervention by the civilian secretary once again 
undermined the NSW commanders attempts to hold his troops accountable and perpetuates 
a culture that is unaccountable. SOCOM may recognize a culture lacking accountability, 
but the actions to exonerate those involved insinuate a desire for it to persist. 
Presidential and public intervention to save war criminals undermine any attempts 
for military leaders to foster an environment of ethical action. A large majority of SOF 
operators detest the unethical actions of Gallagher and those like him. Unfortunately, they 
are drowned out by public reprisal. Society has not promoted the ethical actions of those 
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that stopped or stood up to unethical behavior, many would never recognize their names. 
Instead, society promotes the unethical as heroes. Gallagher is free now, marketing his 
name by selling books and cashing in on his own clothing line.266 A vast majority of SOF 
operators still live by their SOF ethos and believe in the ethical conduct of war, but society 
may be selling a different message; we will protect our heroes at any cost. SOCOM may 
be interested in restoring the ethical foundation of SOF, but will societies influence support 
it? 
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VI. SOCIAL REFLECTION IN SOF 
A. CHANGING SOCIETY 
War is a generative force.267 War can manipulate and alter societies. It can produce 
social change, construct alternate values or ideologies, or divide a populace by creating 
divergent nationalist principles. Arguably, all these social changes have been a part of 
American history within the past twenty years. The U.S. has seemingly found themselves 
in a forever war with no end in sight. One after another, president’s vouge they will end 
the war on terror with no such luck. America has been at war so long most people barely 
recognize it. War has become background music no one hears, or the wallpaper you walk 
past daily but fail to truly recognize. In some respects, perhaps war should be expected as 
the unipolar superpower in a globalized world. Adversaries naturally long to challenge the 
U.S. hoping to acquire more power themselves. As global competition increases, the 
challengers will likely only increase. American society is programmed to compete and has 
been for decades. Prior to one war ending political leaders are already looking to the next 
war. To ease the blow of reality, politicians and the media have replaced war with words 
like conflict hoping for a more positive emotional reaction.268 When the twin towers fell 
on September 11, 2001, a nationalist sentiment emerged. Americans were united and eager 
to take the fight to the enemy, a sense of revenge for the senseless attack.269 Americans 
knew history was changed forever on that day, but many never envisioned how the next 
twenty years would continue to change everything.  
The boundaries of war have vanished. Technology has created a global 
interconnectedness and war is everywhere.270 Although the fight is overseas, constant 
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media coverage brings the war straight to your living room. Chinese People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) colonels Qiao and Wang predicted this in 1999 stating, “when all the 
boundaries lying between the two worlds of war and non-war of military and non-military 
are destroyed, we will enter an era in which visible national boundaries, invisible internet 
space, international law, national law, behavioral norms, and ethical principles will have 
absolutely no restraining effect.”271 The ideals of war have crept into American society.272 
The government has increased the use of surveillance on its own people. American police 
forces have adopted many of the military tactics and equipment used by their military 
counterparts. Swat raids have increased precipitously through the years, less than 3,000 in 
1989 to over 60,000 now.273 Some may suggest this number simply correlates to an 
increase in criminal activity, however, FBI crime statistics show violent crime rates have 
plunged by nearly 50% since 1990.274 Although, if you ask Americans they may say the 
exact opposite. A recent Gallup poll showed 78% of Americans believed crime was rising 
each year.275 If you are wondering how this could be, it is in large part due to the constant 
media coverage Americans are entrapped with. 
Advances in internet technology have drastically increased the pace in which 
information is shared along with the sheer volume of people it can reach. Today there are 
over three 312 million Americans online—95% of the population that is instantly 
connected.276 The internet has largely contributed to the dissolving borders of peace and 
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war, creating the space for information wars. Information wars target populations using 
online media sources and social media to influence “hearts and minds of a targeted 
audience.”277 Info wars manipulate narratives or push political agendas to influence the 
values and beliefs of the population. U.S. adversaries recognize this vulnerability, utilizing 
social media to manipulate or damage public opinion.278 Adversaries goal is to stoke fear 
in a target population or spread hate and create chaos from the inside out.279 Colonels Qiao 
and Wang warned the weapons for the battlespace would change, believing technology 
would eliminate global barriers and create social vulnerabilities.280 American society may 
acknowledge vulnerabilities exists, yet choose to stay connected, at least in part.  
American society has fragmented, the increase in connectedness has ironically led 
to larger disconnects. Today, American society is more divided than it has arguably ever 
been.281 A nationalist American identity has steadily eroded to smaller tribal factions. 
Examining Gallup polls from the last twenty years shows Americans pride in their country 
has been steadily dropping. The poll indicated pride in America is the lowest it has ever 
been (since Gallup has conducted the polls), only half of Americans polled were proud of 
the U.S., down from 87% in 2000.282 Individuals attach their views and values more to 
partisan ideologies than a united state. Arguably, Americans have always done this, but not 
to this degree. This divide has been accelerated in large part by the media.   
Controlling information is the key to influence and power. American corporations 
and politicians are slowly gaining all control of the information, and in turn changing our 
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society. The consolidation of mass media has been the largest contributor to controlling 
information. In 1983 over 50 firms controlled most media platforms, shrinking to nine 
firms in 1998.283 Today, six corporations own 90% of all media platforms, 232 media 
executives control the information of over 270 million Americans.284 The attempt to 
incentivize consent, however, seems to have backfired. Americans have grown more 
untrusting of the media in recent years. Recent polls suggest less than 45% of Americans 
trust the media, the lowest it has ever been. Further examination of that poll provides 
evidence of the partisan divide in the US; only 10% of republicans compared to 73% of 
their democrat counterparts had any trust in the media.285 This data is telling as the news 
organizations not controlled by the major six also happen to predominantly cater to 
republicans, while most news media controlled by the major six lean towards democratic 
views. To many, the idea of objectively reporting news is long gone, replaced instead with 
a skewed representation of what is really happening in American. The overall affect has 
been a loss of trust amongst Americans in general. Half of Americans today do not trust 
each other, believing people are less reliable than they ever have been.286 The lack of trust 
has contributed to the changing American culture. A culture addicted to social media; an 
addiction that is accelerating the change. 
Social media has created an interactive society while reducing individual 
interpersonal skills. Individuals can immediately access social groups that either support 
or agree with their own beliefs or values. The expansion of connectivity enables the 
building and grouping of more diverse subgroups within society. Social media not only 
alters how we interact with each other it can alter the way we think. Like any other form 
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of media there is information control. The instantaneous virtual interaction coupled with 
the massive amounts of information has led to altering individual’s emotional behavior.287 
The art of triggering emotions has led to one of the biggest challenges with social media, 
the control of disinformation.  
Social media provides unregulated territory to spread false narratives and altered 
facts designed to invoke an emotional response from the reader. Social media has created 
a false reality in a sense. Individuals not only believe what they hear or say but have 
adamant information assessable to support their ideas.288 The ability to spread information 
or disinformation through social media creates a delusional influence through the social 
interactions. As more than 80% of Americans use social media, the reach of spreading such 
influence is vast.289 The biggest issue with social media is the type of emotional influence 
it typically results in anger. 
Social media opens the chasm for public discourse on socially controversial topics. 
Applied ethics theories have sought to understand the moral considerations of socially 
controversial issues, yet this becomes more perplexing with social media. In large part due 
to the potential for unethical practice by the state or corporations to artificially manipulate 
the moral principles of our society through information manipulation.290 Individual moral 
development through social values and norms has been replaced with an altered moral view 
of society through the lens of social media. The discourse through social media generates 
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more division, anger, and violence throughout American culture..291 The increase in social 
media use among Americans has contributed to a changing moral culture.  
A shifting American culture has manifested into a divided society. The events of 
2020 could be considered the culmination of societies moral erosion. A year that was 
marked by a global pandemic caused Americans to rely on internet technology more than 
ever. American society saw the benefit of technology through online schooling, 
teleworking, and socially distanced internet gatherings. The same year was also marked by 
rioting, looting, burning of cities, racial tension, and intense political divides. The changing 
American culture culminated with a mob of people sieging the U.S. Capital during a 
congressional vote on January 6, 2021.292 The events of 2020 should be viewed as a 
reflection in changing American ethic and culture. This reflection emanated throughout all 
of society, SOF is no exception. 
B. THE SOCIAL REFLECTION IN SOF 
SOF is a direct reflection of the society it represents. Huntington believed the 
military is shaped by two forces, one of those forces being “social imperative arising from 
social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society.”293 The additional 
sub-identities that are forming throughout society are likely all present within SOF as well. 
SOF is an ecosystem within an ecosystem. The values and norms of society have as much, 
if not more influence on individual operators as that of SOCOM. SOF and society are 
reproductive systems for each other. As war has generated and changed society, so too has 
that society influenced and changed the forces that fight the wars. Arguably, SOF have 
become the most affected by the changing American culture and lack of boundaries. 
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SOCOM operators bear the brunt of a changing society in many ways. SOF are 
directly engaged with the fight on both ends of the spectrum, as military members and as 
members of the broader society. As society has relied on the military to wage continuous 
wars on its behalf, SOF has carried the physical and emotional scars from these wars. The 
lack of boundaries has been a career long reality for SOF. Continuous deployments 
eliminated their ability to differentiate between war and peace well before American 
society recognized its destructive nature. Huntington also believed the “military ethic is 
concrete, permanent, and universal. There is no dichotomy between military-mind and 
civilian-mind as there is no single civilian mind.”294 Even in 1957 Hunting was right, there 
is no single civilian mind; that has never been truer than today. Although, he may have 
underestimated the power of social influence on the military. Huntington may not have 
foreseen what affects a connected society online could have on military professions. In 
1957, the military was the social connection for many. It was the place where like-minded 
individuals joined to form a community bond. Today, those bonds still exist; however, 
social media has created a new limitless environment for bonds to be formed and fostered 
outside military supervision. The SOF ethic is exceptionally strong, but not concrete. It is 
not immune to external influence, and its cracks are evident through the moral decisions 
some SOF members have made. However, the connection between SOF and society and 
the effects of a changing cultural ethic could potentially have lasting effects on special 
operators. 
SOF is not only influenced by society but composed of it. Every single person in 
SOF was once a civilian within society. Those recruited into SOCOM have values and 
beliefs engrained in them from a broader social influence.295 The future of SOF will be 
entrusted to those that are currently being raised in a culture much different than those in 
now. Shifting morals created through media and virtual influence will likely be represented 
throughout all military departments in the future. Arguably, a generation that could lack 
motivation, score lower on tests, or have less developed interpersonal skills does not reflect 
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the SOF operators of today. Atleast not from the media’s perspective. Media influence and 
projection of SOF have become one of their best assets, and arguably one of the main 
contributors to an eroding SOF culture. 
C. SOF AS A COMMODITY 
The romanticized draw towards SOF is not just found within political relationships, 
it can be seen within the general public. SOF has been glorified throughout society. As 
noted before, American exceptionalism thrives through portraying the heroes that protect 
it, the media has done this with SOF abundantly. A culture that once promoted the ideals 
of quiet professional now jump at the chance to sell their story.  
SOF operators have reached celebrity status within today’s society. The mystique 
of special ops units has always provided somewhat of a love affair for American society. 
However, the last decade has resulted in an explosion in SOF exposure. The Navy SEALs 
have been at the forefront capitalizing on societies demand for SOF. The self-promotion 
within the SEAL community has come with adverse effects to the SEAL culture. Current 
Navy SEAL, Lieutenant Forrest Crowell, insisted that the commodification of SEALs has 
caused a counterculture that incentivizes narcissistic and profit-oriented behavior to 
prosper within the community.296 In his thesis titled Navy SEALs Gone Wild: publicity, 
fame, and the loss of the quiet professional, Crowell argues the marketing of SEALs has 
led some former SEALs, politicians, and private interest groups to prosper at the expense 
of a fading SEAL ethos.297 The marketing of SEALs and SOF, however, wasn’t 
completely driven by societal demand. It was the SEALs that drove the market for 
themselves. 
Navy SEALs turned to Hollywood to cash in on their own brand. In 2007 the movie 
Lone Survivor was released, depicting the heroine story of Marcus Luttrell. The movie also 
released around the same time Navy SEAL leadership openly endorsed a movie about Navy 
SEALs called Act of Valor in an attempt to drive up recruiting. These moves may have 
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sparked the social interest, but it was the killing of Osama Bin Laden in 2011 by SEAL 
Team Six that really opened the gateway to celebrity status for Navy SEALs. Although not 
specifically mentioned in President Obama’s address to the nation stating Bin Laden had 
been killed, it did not take long for the press to start publicizing the unit responsible. One 
Business Insider article even stated, “it shows how important the publicity about Bin 
Laden’s killing is to the U.S. that this morning, Team 6 is front-page news.”298 
Subsequently, two separate individuals have come forward since the raid claiming credit 
for being the official shooter that took the life of Bin Laden. Both releasing books to garner 
public notoriety for their roles in the prolific mission. Since then, the flood gates of SEALs 
commodifying their brand have opened. Books about Navy SEALs and written by Navy 
SEALs have skyrocketed. From 1962–2010 only 80 books were written about Navy 
SEALs, since then that number has risen over 200%..299 Books are not the only market 
SEALs have broken in to. Podcasts, movies, fitness proprietors, merchandise sales, 
national television series, video game consultants, and even appearing as guests on 
mainstream media platforms, if you name it SEALs have stuck their foot in the door. The 
Navy does not even own the rights to its own brand website.300 The website navyseals.com 
is actually owned by a former SEAL that claims to be ““the only authentic Navy SEAL 
media property on the Internet.”301 The public fame should lead some to wonder what 
happened to being a quiet professional? 
The self-promotion of SEALs has eroded the culture and altered their identity. 
Crowell argues the self-aggrandizement and self-promotion of SEALs has “eroded military 
effectiveness, damaged national security, and undermined healthy civil-military 
relationships.”302 SEALs are divided. There are those that still believe in the ethos which 
in part reads, “I do not advertise the nature of my work, nor seek recognition for my 
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actions,” and there are those current and former which clearly do not.303 Navy SEAL 
leadership noticed this trend back in 2012 and 2014 writing letters to the force admonishing 
those that cashed in on the SEAL brand and expressing shame and guilt in their actions.304 
The letters did nothing, the promotional tactics of SEALs continued. As of April 2021, 
three members (current and former) of SEAL Team Six appeared on a CBS news segment 
addressing the issues of self-promotion within the command. The three men, speaking from 
anonymity, stated former SEALs cashing in on fame are exposing critical tactics, 
techniques, and procedures. All three insisted most SEALs “want the books to stop, want 
the movies to stop, want the tv shows to stop,” SEALs want to go back into the 
shadows.305The men ended by saying, “we are here in desperation, we need help.”306 The 
men on CBS seemed to echo Lt. Crowell’s sentiment; societies legitimization of SEALS 
cashing in has had a corrupting effect on the community.307 Unfortunately, the SEALs 
woes continue to play out in the press, and in this case all press is not good press. 
The glorification of SEALs by the media has recently been met with attempts to 
vilify them. Most articles written today are regarding recent transgressions SEALs have 
been involved with, most notably Eddie Gallagher. A google search of the phrase “Navy 
SEALs war crimes” from 2010–2012 shows 40 thousand returns. That same google search 
from 2018–2020 provides just under 500 thousand. This should lead some to wonder, have 
the SEALs gone that far off track? Is it possible the media has created a perception of 
SEALs acting unethically or is it that SEALs are in fact more unethical? The answer is a 
mixture of both perhaps. There is no denying the self-aggrandizement mentioned in Lt 
Crowell’s thesis has caused multiple identities to formulate within the command.308 Some 
SEALs even view the criticism as inevitably a good thing for the command. In a New York 
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Times Article relating to the Eddie Gallagher case, one SEAL stated the publicity was 
“finally casting a light on problems that the SEAL teams had kept hidden,” and that “rogue 
elements in the SEALs had been operating as if rules and standards did not apply to them, 
and that too often, SEALS who were overly focused on loyalty have covered up for one 
another.”309 The men cast as heroes had fallen victim to their own hype. This statement, 
along with the three men that spoke with CBS expose the hidden truths behind the social 
influence of SOF; social admiration and self-aggrandizement had contributed to a culture 
that is clearly in trouble. However, one should also question the medias’ role in creating 
the culture. How much of the culture was exacerbated or perpetuated from a growing media 
narrative? There is evidence the news over promotes the transgressions of SEALs as well. 
Examining the returns from one google search shows over 65% of all articles written since 
2001 relating to SEAL misconduct all pertain to the same eight incidents. In some cases, 
telling the same story long enough make some start to believe it. There may be a reason for 
this, and it is political.  
D. SOF AS A POLITICAL PAWN 
America’s SOF operators have increasingly been used as political fodder for 
political attention. As partisan divides widen in the U.S., the media and politicians are using 
SOCOM as pundits to push or detract from the narrative. Huntington believed the military 
should be out of politics, stating true military professional are “immune to politics.”310 
Janowitz later stressed the military was very political, however should be non-partisan in 
nature.311 The problem with both views is that arguably SOF today is neither. In part, this 
again may be partially attributable to SOF’s own commercializing of their brand. More 
time in the spotlight results in more time for scrutiny.  
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The tactic of using the military in political debate is nothing new. Just as politicians 
are inherently drawn to SOF, their opponent has attacked the relationship for political gain. 
President Bush often spoke of the work SOF was doing in the GWOT, and often political 
news media would attach his saying to their actions, either in a good light or bad light. It 
has been in the last decade, however, a partisan divide has begun to occur within SOF. In 
a 2012 CNN segment the headlines read “Ex-SEALS slam Obama over leaks.”312 The 
anchor goes on to mention how former members of the Navy SEALs were “slamming” 
President Obama for exposing tactics and procedures (the irony could not be more real), to 
which the anchor responded the republicans were resorting to “swift-boat tactics” and that 
in fact the NSW commander himself Admiral McRaven endorsed President Obama taking 
credit for the raid on Bin Laden.313 Seemingly after the open debates, the partisan politics 
of SOF would be on full display. 
SOF’s willingness to appear on national news media perpetuated partisan military 
support. Lt. Crowell demonstrated in his thesis through google searches how Navy SEALs 
disproportionately appeared as guests on FOX news over any other media platform.314 As 
FOX news is known to lean towards republican ideals, this creates a perception that SOF 
are not partisan neutral. Repeating Lt. Crowell’s search methodology today provides 
further evidence of two things; not only is there a disproportionate appearance, but the 
media coverage of topics tends to be more in line with partisan ideology. While searching 
“Navy SEAL Fox news” from 2018–2021 you will get just under 300 thousand hits. The 
first page within google is full of articles that seemingly support Eddie Gallagher creating 
a positive connection with President Trump, headlines that read as such: 
• Navy SEALs to shift from counterterrorism to Global threats. 
• Former Navy SEAL Eddie Gallagher sues Navy. 
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• Navy Scraps Review for three SEAL Officers 
• Plea from a Navy SEAL’s brother: Mr. President The system is broken, 
and we need your help to fix it. 
• Pete Hegseth swims with Navy SEALs to honor veterans. 
• Navy SEAL Edward Gallagher found not guilty. 
• Edward Gallagher: The story behind trump 
Searching the same phrase but with CNN, a traditionally liberal news media, the results 
look much different. There is just over 100 thousand hits, and the results are much more 
daunting in their picture they paint of Navy SEALs. 
• Transgender Navy SEAL: Biden order ‘going to give a lot of other 
individuals that change to finally be themselves’. 
• U.S. Navy SEAL team ordered home from ISIS fight for drinking alcohol 
while deployed. 
• Navy SEAL leaders fired after allegations of sexual assault and drinking. 
• Edward Gallagher: Navy launches review of SEAL’s. 
• Navy SEAL commander: SEALs have ‘have drifted from our Navy core 
values’. 
Continuous searches bring back the same results, depending on which news media 
you watch you may have a much different perception of SOF. This is potentially do to both 
timing and the political climate. President Trump was openly a supporter of special 
operations forces, and throughout the same period SOF members became more vocal on 
television as political pundits. SOCOM has been one of the most trusted institutions in 
America, the romanticized connections of politicians coupled with their historic low trust 
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ratings would mean bolstering support with a highly respected partner.315 As partisan gaps 
increase, a natural tactic of opposing political parties is to destroy the credibility of 
opposing parties relationships.316 In this case, SOF not only gave them the needed 
misconduct to support the campaign of discredit, but had already created the perception of 
partisan support by openly criticizing elected officials in the media. The media has 
certainly perpetuated a perception of SOF partisan support. However, SOF themselves are 
again partly to blame.  
As politics change in our nation, there is plenty of evidence to support the idea that 
society influences the military; however, less time is spent examining how much the 
military influences society, namely through politics. When President Joe Biden recently 
picked retired general Lloyd Austin as the Secretary of Defense many criticized the 
selection. Secretary Austin was also on the board of directors for Raytheon, a major U.S. 
defense contractor.317 Austin is also an active board member on many other large 
corporations with ties to the government. Additionally, Austin required a waiver from 
congress to fill the SECDEF position as he had not met the mandatory seven years out of 
service, a period meant to mentally separate a uniformed service member to becoming a 
civilian leader.318 This is not the first time a waiver has been submitted; previous SECDEF 
under President Trump, retired Marine general James Mattis required the same waiver.319  
It has become more commonplace for retired military to translate their skills into 
politics and defense industry contracting positions. Huntington describes this as a form of 
influential power, one that provides influence through the institutions the military 
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professional is connected to.320 A 2018 study found over 380 retired military had filled 
positions as “board members, executives, lobbyists, or consultants with defense 
contractors.”321 Veterans are additionally finding more seats in Congress. Currently, there 
are 76 representatives that are veterans, of them 71% are republican.322 The influx of 
veteran influence throughout the defense department and congressional leaders has 
arguably led to more public scrutiny of the military as members records are constantly 
evaluated based on their service. The affects have resulted in SOF being directly involved 
with controversial social issues. 
As political smear campaigns over partisan agendas increase, SOF has found 
themselves directly in the conversation. Within the past year there have been plenty of 
societal issues that have resulted in much debate. As COVID raged throughout 2020, 
partisan debates over vaccines became the norm. In attempts to garner support for 
Americans to take the experimental vaccine, one CNBC article turned to the military. The 
article titled Fauci says military members who opt out of Covid vaccine are inadvertently 
‘part of the problem’ was the media’s attempt to pointedly target military members to get 
involved; in a sense virtue shaming those military members that had decided not to get a 
vaccine.323 The irony of the article is that military members are potentially the most 
vaccinated members of society, yet targeted as a problem if they were to opt out of one 
more. Then, in March of 2021, after a year of racial tension in the U.S., President Biden 
stated he was prioritizing SOF to look at diversity and inclusion within the ranks. Shortly 
after, FOX News host Tucker Carlson took aim at President Biden’s initiative to create 
“maternity flight suits” and mocked the President’s diversity and inclusion campaign as 
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pandering to “woke” identity politics.324 Carlson went on to claim the job of the U.S. 
military is to protect and defend the U.S. and that requirements should not be based on 
appearance or color, but a capable standard.325 Military officials were quick to respond to 
Carlson’s comments, one pentagon official stating “what we absolutely won’t do is take 
personnel advice from a talk-show host or the Chinese military.”326 The fact that FOX, a 
right- leaning news source, made comments bashing an opposing party’s initiatives is not 
surprising. What should be more surprising is the top military official’s response. An 
organization that is to be nonpartisan and nonpolitical was now openly feuding with a 
clearly partisan news source. The military has often been the target of debate in the media, 
but has traditionally remained silent, at least in official response. The public feud fueled 
future segments for FOX News. In response to the diversity and inclusion initiative, 
SOCOM announced through social media they had hired their new Chief of Diversity & 
Inclusion, Mr. Richard Torres-Estrada.327 Fox host Tucker Carlson again took aim at SOF, 
stating the new initiative did nothing to improve safety or maintain a high standard of 
American elite, rather the military was caving to woke social initiatives.328 Carlson went 
on to highlight the new chief also had some troubling social media history; history that 
promoted anti-police sentiments, and a photo comparing former President Trump to Adolf 
Hitler.329 An investigation was subsequently launched by SOCOM into the posts of 
Estrada and he has since been reassigned pending the results of the investigation.330 The 
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public spat with Fox News should indicate two things: When the military gets involved 
with partisan or political discourse it potentially fuels the fire; and social media has a direct 
effect on SOF.  
The topic of diversity and inclusion has created much debate regarding SOF. In a 
recent congressional hearing, much of the content centered around building a more diverse 
force. One key finding presented by retired Army Lieutenant General Michael Nagata, a 
30-year SOF veteran, stated that society may want a more diverse SOF, but currently SOF 
struggles with recruiting minorities and women.331 More research is required to understand 
the barriers and obstacles to recruiting in SOF to properly address the diversity of the 
organization. The issue of race and diversity within SOF should be addressed but must be 
implemented with a thorough understanding and knowledge of the current structure to 
ensure acceptable standard operating capability.332 
These revelations of the diversity chief come amidst the increased spotlight on the 
military. Following the events of January 6, 2021 when the U.S. Capital was overrun with 
protestors, among them current and former military members, SECDEF Austin announced 
extremist in the ranks was a threat to the force. The entire DOD had a military stand-down 
day to discuss the topic and ensure the message was clear it would not be tolerated. To 
date, it is unknown if and how large the problem of extremism is within the military.333 
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VII. CONCLUSION: SOCOM 2030 
The future of SOF culture will be is largely dependent on how civilian and military 
leaders react to the influences that surround special operators. Ethical misconduct within 
the force should not be dismissed, it is unacceptable behavior that should not be condoned. 
Although it would be easiest to simply say it was a few bad apples, this would be negating 
the multiple factors that can influence moral judgement and decisions. The organizational 
culture of SOCOM has focused on war, while losing focus on the force.  
Throughout history SOF has been integral to supporting national security but 
overuse and over reliance has created an unstable environment within SOCOM. America’s 
desire for SOF to be the solution to every problem has resulted in the unsustainable growth 
of an organization that now struggles to understand all its roles.334 Romantic ideals have 
enabled politicians to over rely on SOF and led a public to love them at all costs. SOF has 
become the pawn to the American way of war, a never-ending battle to remain superior. 
The affects are hidden to some, justified by others, but an honest objective look into 
SOCOM reveals a broken culture and eroding ethic. Twenty years of continuous fighting 
have had damaging effects on SOF culture; an organization built for war has lost the most 
to it. War became the culture. The culture was seemingly a symptom, however; reflecting 
the complexity of environmental influences that produced it. Politicians demanded it, 
leaders were raised in it, promotions relied on it, and the people could not imagine a world 
without it. Internally, there was nothing left untouched by the presence of war. Externally, 
there was much the same. Society has promoted the ideals of the American elite, embracing 
their actions as heroes with an infallible reputation. The military is one of the few 
institutions left within society that people still trust. Essentially the only institution society 
trusts to handle difficult foreign relations. The cost of ethical erosion to some is simply the 
cost of war. 
 




As leaders look to the future in attempts to realign the ethical focus of SOF, they 
must first acknowledge the intrinsic link to an eroding culture. The individual ethic is 
undoubtedly influenced by cultural norms and values. Fixing the problem is complex and 
multifaceted. SOCOM is a complex organization operating in a dynamic environment, the 
ability to break down or control the variables is nearly impossible. A singular solution does 
not exist. Narrow focus on singular influences will likely produce an unforeseen cascade 
of affects in other facets of SOF culture.  
Understanding the internal and external influences that are present is the only path 
to a renewed focus on American commandos. One of Edgar Schein’s primary embedding 
mechanisms insists “how leaders react to critical incidents and organizational crisis” will 
determine the culture.335 The 2011 POTFF study proposed “major paradigm shifts in 
holistic organizational culture and behavior of the force” was required to enable future 
success of SOF.336 The 2019 CR found initiatives that resulted from the study were only 
marginally successful due in large part to the challenge of implementation.337 In other 
words, SOCOM acknowledged cultural issues were effecting the force, but did not fully 
embrace a culture that was intent on fixing it. The 2019 CR found much of the same issues 
listed throughout the 2011 POTFF study, only with increased magnitude. SOCOM 
leadership appears to have heard the latest message from the CR clearly this time. 
Recognizing a culture that needs refocused, commanders have called for change. 
Rear Admiral Collin Green sent a message to his NSW members stating only “we 
have a problem.”338 Admiral Green could have been speaking to many different units 
within SOCOM when he sent that message. The commander had a goal to fix a troubled 
culture within the Navy SEALs.339 Green was not alone in his efforts to fix ethically 
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misguided cultures, there are many units within SOCOM that still hold true to unwavering 
sacrifice and dedication to their country and do so while conducting themselves honorably 
and selflessly. Unfortunately, they are drowned out by those that forgo the responsibility 
to uphold the SOF ethos. The ethical misconduct present within SOF is a direct result of 
the misguided and eroding SOF culture. Changing a culture will require a dedication to 
leadership, accountability, and a thorough self-reflection of those within SOCOM. A 
comprehensive analysis that thoroughly understands the internal and external influences is 
critical to a true self-assessment if change is desired. 
While in a class at Naval Postgraduate School, a professor asked a class with twelve 
different members from SOCOM, “what makes SOF special”?340 The quiet that filled the 
room was telling, a full answer was never given. Nearly all members of the class were from 
a different unit within SOCOM, a different culture. The inability for anyone to identify 
with what makes them part of something special would lead some to believe the cultural 
erosion and identity crisis continues to spread. Without a renewed focus on SOF culture, 
the gap will potentially widen. When members of SOCOM are asked in 2030 what makes 
them special, what will they say? 
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